Systems analysis: a powerful but dangerous weapon by McDonald, Francis E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1968-06












































United States Naval Academy, 1952
A Thesis Submitted to the School of Government and
Business Administration of The George Washington
University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Business Administration
June, m
Thesis directed by
Harry Robert Page, Ph. D.
Associate Professor of Business Administration
VMS
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL






The Arrival of Systems Analysis within the
Department of Defense
The Rising Tide of Criticism
II. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS - STRUCTURAL APPROACH . . 16
Lome Definitions
Planning - Programming - Budgeting
i: Synthesis




IV. AN ?&A1SAL OF THE METHOD
Limitations and Weaknesses
The Benefits













"It's much easier to be critical than to be correct. "
From a speech by Benjamin Disraeli, February 11, 1851
The National Security Act of 1947, providing for the unification
of the armed forces of the United States under a Secretary of Defense,
initiated a series of reforms culminating with the installation of the
Planning-Frogramming-Budgeting Concept in 1961 by Robert S. McNamara.
ith budgetary control, McNamara has accomplished what no prior
Secretary of Defense could achieve: (1) integration of strategic plans
and over-all defense programs within a program and budget structure,
and (2) control of the military in a manner approaching absolute
dominance.
The impact of the management skill of McNamara upon the defense
establishment has obviously been profound. The controversy surrounding
his work does not obscure the reasonable certainty that much of it will
endure long after he has gone. As President Truman pointed out at the
d of World Si ar II in his Message to the Congress proposing a single
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Prior to V orld War II, military technology changed slowly.
Military experience could relate new weapons, which were essentially
product improvements, to forces and in turn to ~trate . "The bewilder-
ing array of entirely feasible alternative forces which our scientists can
offer today has enormously acomplicated our problems of choice. There
is hardly a military task which cannot be accomplished in a multitude of
ways. " f As a consequence, the planner on the highest level today can
decide what he wants to achieve. Ith this leading question answered,
he begins to design strategy appropriate to his goal, and then chooses
the tools, the weapon systems, and their deployment to implement the
strategy agreed upon. c ''Strategic thought has by now overcome the
reluctance to admit power as an element of national policy. The strict
separation and division between policy and power has broken down so
that Strategy now appears in its true, complete sense, so aptly ex-
pressed by General Albert C. v. edemeyer: "Grand Strategy is the art
and science of employing all of a nation's resources to accomplish ob-
jectives defined by national policy. "®
'Russell Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
General Purpose Programs (Systems Analysis), "Systems Analysis and
Cost Effectiveness, " Defense Industry Bulletin , II, No. 9 (September,
.
1.
8Urs Schwarz, American Strategy : A New Perspective, (New York:









m President Truman proposed unification of the military
services to the Congress in 1947, he stated, "we should have integrated
strategic plans and a unified military program and budget. " lv Subse-
quently, President Elsenhower in a special message to Congress on the
195c reorganization of the Department of Defense stressed: 'It is. .
.
mandatory that the initiative for this planning and direction rest not
with the separate services but directly with the Secretary of Defense
and his operational advisors...' 11 The reorganization of 1956 and the
amendments to the National Security Act of 1949 creating the Office of
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) recognized the need for
changes at the administrative level, but integration of the military at
the resource level had not occurred.
Prior to 1961, despite many innovations and reforms in the finan-
cial management in the JL apartment of Defense and the separate military
departments, the Secretary of Defense did not integrate his military
plannin - with his resource requirements or budget. 1 '- Budgetary reform
in the United States has evolved through three distinct stages. In the
initial stage, the primary emphasis was on central control of spending
David Novick, (ed. ) Program Budgeting: Program analysis and
the federal Budget
, A RAND Corporation publication, (Washington: U. . .
Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 51.











6and the budget was utilized to guard against administrative abuses.
The detailed classification of objects of expenditure was the main
control mechanism. The second stage was management-oriented. It
was concerned with the efficient performance of work and prescribed
activities. The performance budget, officially introduced by the Hoover
Commission in 1949, recommended. .. "that the whole budgetary concept
of the Federal Government. . . be refashioned by the adoption of a bud-
get based on functions, activities, and projects. '-^ The Hoover Com-
mission was concerned with improving Congressional review of the
budget. To this end, the amendments to the National Security Act in
1149 provide that the Department of Defense prepare, present, justify
and, where practical, administer authorised programs so as to account
for, and report, the cost of performance of readily identifiable func-
tional programs and activities, segregating operating and capital pro-
grams. 14 The last stage of budgeting reform is associated with
Planning-
F
Jrogramming-Budgeting and. . . "is reflected in the planning
orientation of the new PPB system. It had roots in Keynesian econom-
ics and the new technology of systems analysis. " l ^ , 1th emphasis on
ioJesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting
,
(New York: John iley
& Sons, Inc. , 1956), p. 135.
14Ibid.
, p. 135 and 136.
l5/\llen Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform,
"






the planning aspects, PPB has two primary aims: first, to permit
analysis of total force structure for all the services in terms of common
missions or national objectives; second, to project the resource impact
or cost of the proposed force structures over an extended period of
time.
8 the technological revolution in military weapons affected think-
ing concerning unification, budget and strategy at the national level; this
same revolution, through the medium of research, sponsored primarily
by the military, gave rise to a whole new industry. Major colleges
and universities and non-profit organizations were actively competing for
a portion of the Defense budget to conduct research and analysis on
military and national security matters. To gain an appreciation of the
magnitude of this new industry consider that... "there are, in all,
about three hundred and fifty non-profit organizations, throe hundred
research centers at universities, and more than a thousand research
organizations of inaustrial companies and private foundation:- engaged in
solving problems more or less related to military security and strat-
egy. "16 This growth is even more significant considering that...
before 1943, practically all the specialized intellectual work of the
government was done "in-house" by government laboratories." 1 ? A
government survey in 63 reported that the University of Notre Dame









received one-sixth of Its total operating ' adltures for education and
general purposes from Federal funds; two dollars of every three spent
for engineering and science research came from the government. The
same survey ranked the Massachusetts Institute of Technolo twenty-
first in the 1902 list of profit- making prime contractors in defense
research and development with $74,956,000 in grants and contracts. L
The new community produces Ideas, The most famous of the
"think" organizations is the RAND Corporation which was ordered
organized and subsidiz General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Air
Corps during II, to "get th st brains and turn them loose on the
problems of the future. "*• Originally set up as an independent division
of Douglas Aircraft Company in 1946, RAND became an Independent
non-profit corporation in November, 1948, with funds supplied by the
Ford Foundation. Employing a professional staff of E 50, of 550
are of top rank in the fields of natural and political science, economics,
social science, systems operations, physics, engineering
tics, RAND conducts studies of broad scope from politics and
rrilla warfare to astronautlc rcent of which are directed by
the Air Force. ^ J The Army and Navy have their equivalents of RAND,
and, in 1956, the Defeni partment subsidized the Institute for
** Ray mono, op. cit.













gDefense Analysis. One of the attraction? for the Defense Department
was the ability to hire scientist? and technicians at rates of pay sub-
21
stantially above Federal salary scales.
The interpenetratlon of the military by the civilian has gro
rapidly. Ultary officer?, looking back on a tradition of isolation from
the rest of the nation which »as inclined to consider the science of
military knowledge as a pastime, sporadically and superficially, should
have some misgivings concerning too large a penetration of the civilian
element into their world. Failure to achieve unification in fact, in Spite
of organizational measure? to support unity, has been cited as a singular
failure of the military profession and has allowed the lay strategist the
occasion to invade the area of military affairs. ^2
Commencing in 1953, RAND Corporation published a continue
series of memorandum? on systems analysis, cost sffectiveness analysis
and program budgeting, /dditionally, during 1955 and 1959, RAND
offered intensive five-day courses entitled "An i npreciation of Analysis
for Military Decisions 1 ' to military officer? and civilians associated with
the armed forces. It was basically an analytic approach to long-rau
military planning. • During th
I
ae period, a number of RAND
^ :Kaymond, op. cit.
, p. 148.
22Schwarz, op. cit.
, p. i- .
''• d







economists (including Smithies, Novick, and McKean) began to urge
reform of the Federal budget system. ** Much of this v,ork resulted in
publication of The xLConomics of Defense in the Nuclear <.. a by Hitch
and McKean. This book must have come to the attention of McNamara
through his interest in planning and management sciences, 25 "and
probably was responsible for Hitch's appointment as Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller). "Thus, by i960 there was a general
recognition of the need for change. The conceptual tools had been
developed. Congressional leaders had expressed desire for reform, and
many military officers were ready and able to participate in the progra .
The arrival of McNamara as Secretary of Defense in January 1961 re-
sulted in a concerted and intensive effort to focus these new developments
on the vital and complicated issues of U. S. national security in the
1960*8. •"'- program budget, including a proposed format is contained
in Chapter 4 of The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear ;:.ge and
provided the blueprint for McNamara 's Management Revolution
.
^Schick, op. cit






'Samuel A. Tucker (ed. ), . modern Design for Defon; v e Decision ,
McNamara-Hitch-iimthoven Anthology," (Washington, D. C. : Industrial






the first Secretary of Defense educated in the modern tools of mana -
ment analysis, he made it clear to the Department that he wanted all
its problems approached in a logical, analytical way. ' The current
plamnmg -program ming-budgeting procedures and concepts of systems
analysis have already proved so useful that President Johnson in august
1965 directed their extension on a Government- asis to present us
with the alternatives and the information on which. . .(to). .. make better
decisions. ''
The Rising Tide of Criticism
\ ith all the benefits ana acnievements ascribed to PFB and
systems analysis, criticism still mounts daily. 'Concluded one industri-
alist with a long ;;ackcrround of iv'ilitary experience: 'There is nothi,
new about cost-effectiveness. It has always been arouna. The differ-
ence is that today it Is the big item and yesteraay it was just an item. .
.
What, after all, is the true measure of cost-effectiveness < In time of
peace it can be a constant game and the cost-effectiveness experts can
shine like stars. But, in time of war or other unnamed hostilities, the
true measure is, !;How are we doing?" In short, how are our cost-
effective weapons making out on the battlefield. Her" I hero it






bearings. It's what's up front that counts. "30
Inherent in the systems analysis approach is the ability to formu-
late or design the problem; to choose appropriate objectives; to define
the relevant, important environments or situations in which to test
alternatives; to judge the reliability of cost ana other data; and finally,
but not least, the ingenuity to invent new systems or alternatives to
evaluate. Throughout this process, no matter how detailed or empirical
the data supporting a request may be, human factors permeate the entire
uence. "Judgment is always of critical importance in designin
analysis, choosing the alternatives to be compared, and selecting the
final course of action. The manager does not allow himself to become
a slave to a certain investment cutoff level, for example, no matter I
quantitatively exact Its derivation may b .
The primary indictment of the present centralized process, how-
ever, according to Stephen Enke, is its failure to be an effective instru-
ment of continued change. The fear expressed here stems from t
rigidity of the program change proposal chain and the sluggishness of
the system to accept change. This sts that the increased central-
isation of defense management may already be having a detrimental
effect upon the morale and judgment of lower level managers, not to
V
^C. . . Borklund, "Is the U. . Iready Embarked On Unilateral
Disarmament'; ", i:rmea Forces Yanaeoment , November, 1967, p. 71 .
•'^Donald J. Smalter and Rudy L. Ruggles, Jr. , 'Six Business
Lessons from the Pentagon," Harvard Business Review
. Vol. 44, No










mention national security interests. 6 ?-> Another criticism of the central-
ization of authority is the fear that it silences the possible voices of
dissent by the military reducing arguments that must be offered and
heard. "
-"
One of the most often heard criticisms is the suspicion that,
somehow or other, cost effectiveness studies put "dollars before national
security," or will result in the U.S. going to war with ;, cut-rate, cut
quality, cheapest-to-buy weapons. "34 v.ith the current emphasis on cost
effectiveness, the military is being requested to procure only proven
systems which can be costed. In the words of General Bernard A.
Schriever, Commander, Air Force Systems Command until August, 1966,
all of the great developments of this century are the products of in-
vention, not prediction. U'shful thinking has never produced an ounce
of hardware or an iota of defense. "35
/>mong criticism from Congress are comments by Senator Henry
M. Jackson (D- T > ash. ) to the extent that systems analysis and cost
effectiveness studies have been greatly oversold and bedeviled with
difficulties. "The abuse of cost-effectiveness studies is well known to
those of us who serve in the various committees of the Congress. Cost
^Stephen Enke, Defense Management
,
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.
:






35c. . . Borklund, "Cost-Effectiveness vs. Creativity: Fart II. "











utility analysis can be used as easily to justify a decision as to make a
sensible chioce. It can be employed as a weapon to try to overwhelm
and beat down other viewpoints. And no idea is so good that it cannot
be killed by over-analysis. ''^
A summation of middle management criticism within the Pentagon
Us given in the following six point .
1-The lack of major push behind promising new weapon
developments will weaken seriously the nation's military posture
within a decade when that strength #111 be needed most.
-Really dynamic innovation has been effectively discouraged,
either by design or default.
-The military contribute to their own ailments by asking
for half a loaf (informally to see if it is acceptable) rather than
all of what they are convinced they m mainly out of fear that
if they push for the total program, they will end up .vith nothing
at all.
4-Most of the so-called ' n: •• procurement has really been
buying of obsolescence and calling it progress.
5-The non-decision-making in new weaponry makes no
logical sense if p] ainst the longstanding policy pronoun-,
ment that the Nation can afford "whatever is necessary for
national security" unless;
G-It is first assumed that the present leadership is purpose-
ly embarked on a program of not maintaining the stron;
military force possible, the id that nilitary^ftrcn-fta
a destabilizing influence "which can provoke wars.
a.
. Congress , ! ubcommlttee of the Committee on Government
©rations, Hear 1 Planning-Froaramming-Budgetnrg 90th Cong. 1st,
.. , 1967, p. 66.








The range, sources, and frequency of criticism of system waaly
has been serious enough to ^tart several Congressional inquiries. The
criticism, instead of airninishin - ft:r the speed with which PPB and
systems analysis were installed within the DOD, has continued to mount
over a period of seven Ty ears. In an effort to test the validity of crit-
icism, this thesis will explore the concepts, methods, strengths and
weaknesses of systems analysis and review1 several of the controversial
decisions which involved the Congress. Ac previously stated, the
purpose of the writer is to determine what safeguards are necessary to
assure that systems analysis within the Department of Defense is, in





SYSTE NALYSIS— • ,: TRUCTUR/.L APPROACH
"If systems analysis Isn't synonymous with PPBS, what is it? M
Samuel M. Greenhour
Some Definitions
E, S, " uade, who compiled the RAND Corporation lectures on
systems anal- sis says it is still largely a form of art' in which it is
not possible to lay down "fixed rules which need only be followed with
exactness. "2 Broadly definea it is any analytic study designed to aid a
decisionmaker Identify a preferred choice from among possible alterna-
tives. Attempts to precisely define the concept out of context from the
specific system or category of problems to which it is applied, has
proved difficult for even Its most renowned practitioners.
Aaron V ildavsky, noted writer and political economist, offers an
incisive description of the systems analysis technique employed in the
Pentagon today. He indicates that creativity and innovation are the
essential elements; such pat processes as matching means to ends or
ISamuel A. Greenhour , "The Flannino-Programming-Budgeting
t 33: Rationals, Language, and Idea- Relationships, " Public admin-
istration Review . (December, 1986), p. 276.
2e« . .uade <ed. ), Analysis for Military Decisions, (Santa Monica,




fitting ends to match means are ordinarily avoided, preferring instead
to relate elements imaginatively into new systems which create their
own means and ends. New objectives are continuously played against
cost elements until a creative synthesis is achieved. Given objectiv
are not considered constraints since their solidity dissipates under
analysis. ldavsky infers that people do not know what they want
because they do not know what they can get. Since no one knows how
to teach creativity, it is not surprising that no one can define what
systems analysis is or how it should be practiced. 2
The initial Memorandum of the Jackson subcommittee of the U. ! .
Senate Committee on Government Operations holding hearings on Planning-
Frogramming-Budgeting included the following in its opening remarks:
Systems analysis is intended to present decision-makers
with a systematic and comprehensive comparison of the costs
and benefits of alternative approaches to a policy goal, taking
advantage of techniques variously described as operations re-
search or cost-effectiveness studies. There is an emphasis on
quantitative analysis. Computers have make it possible to handle
large quantities of data and applied mathematics has provided
ingenious statistical techniques for dealing with some kinds of
uncertainty.
Some of the less historically-minded proponents of PPBS
strongly imply that it is something brand new, providing decision-
makers for the first time with a rational basis for choosing
between alternative policies. Actually, cost-benefit analysis
seems to have begun in the Garden of Eden (see Genesis, 3),
and the problem from the outset has been to avoid an under-
estimation of costs and an overestimation of benefits. Costs
and gains have been compared throughout our government's
history whenever a decision to spend or not to spend had to
^Aaron vildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-
Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting," Public










be made, and Congrer licitlv called for cost-benefit stud!
as far back as the Rivers and Harbors Act of 190 . Operations
researcl loastrated its usefuln La arid ar II. Statistical
control, pushed by Robert Lovett as Assistant ecretary of . ar
for Air in orld War II, was the forerunner of many function;:; of
the Comptroller of the Defense Department and a predecessor of
systems analysis. The idea of performance or program budgeting
can be traced back at least to President Taft's Commission on
Economy and efficiency, which published its path-breaking report,
"The Need for a National Budget," in 1912. And program budgets
for perio tending well into the future have long been the rule
in progressive banks and business firms.
PPB say for the first time identify these techniques as a
,ctem, " give them a special name and advertise them, but the
approach itself is as old as the problem of the buyer »ho would
like to make two purchases and has money only for one. 4
Dr. Alain C. Dnthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems
Analysis), who testified before the Jackson subcommittee on various
occasions has given several definitions of what he considers systems
analysis to be:
.... systems analysis is just one name for an approach to
problems of decision making that good management has always
practice I, The essence of as analysis is not mysterioe
not particularly complicated, nor entirely new, nor of special
value only to the Defense planning. Rather, it is a reasoned
approach to highly complicated problems of choice characterised
by much uncertainty; it provides room for v Lffering values
and judgments; and it seeks alternative ways of doinc the job. °
items analysis is an effort to define the issues and
alternatives clearly, and to provide responsible officials with a
full accurate, and meaningful summary of as many as possible of
the relevant facts so that they can exercise well-informed
^U. S, Congress, Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations, Hearings, Planning-Programming-Budjetin- , 0th Con .




judgment; it Is not a substitute for judgment."
7stems analysis is a method of Interrogation and debate
suited to compi uantitative issues. Systems analysis Is a set
of groun rule for constructive debate; it gives the participants
useful guidelines for proceeding to clarify and resolve disa r -
ments.
. hat is systems analysis. I have not been able to produce
30d rief definition. I would describe the art, as it has
evolved in the Department of Defense, as a reasoned approach to
problems of decision. Some have defined it as "quantitative
common sense. " Alternatively, it is the application of methods of
quantitative- "conomic analysis ana the scientific method, in the
broadest sense, to the problems of choice of weapon systems and
strategy. It is a systematic attempt to provide decision-makers
with a full, accurate, and meaningful summary of the information
relevant to clearly defined issues and alternative :
.
here does this leave tu V hat is operations research or
.
:ns analysis at the Defense policy level all aoout'. I think
that it can best be described as a continuing dialogue between the
policy-maker and the systems analyst, in which the policy- maker
ks for alternative solutions to his problems, makes decisions to
exclude some, and makes value judgments and policy decisions,
while the analyst attempts to clarify the conceptual framework in
Ich decisions must be made, to define the alternative possll
objectives and criteria, and to explore in as clear terms as
possible (and quantitatively) the cost and effectiveness of alternative
courses of action.
The analyst at this level is not computing optimum solutions
or makln isions. In fact, computation is not his most impor-
tant contribution. And he ' loin someone else to make
cisions. His job is to ask and find answers to the questions:
t are we trying to do 7" hat r- the alternative ways 3f
achieving it ould they cost, and how effective would
the hat does the decision- maker need to know in order
to make a choir nd to collect and organize this information
for those who are responsible for deciding whi Defense
rlining suppl
r, op. cit.







program ought to be. °
The above list of definitions is by no mean?; complete. One will
find as many definitions as there are publication:- devoted to describing
terns analysis and its role in PPB. Cne method, the one this writer
be rib the structural framework for decision making
dch ha.: evolved within the Department of Defense sine:: 1961,
P lanning-I to:;ramming-Budgeting
Although one could trace the basic concepts of program ting,
corically, as the initial Memorandum of the Jackson subcommittee did,
the origins and indeed I lueprints for PPB within the Defense Depart-
r present? in two documents from the RAND Corporation: one,
The economics of Defense in the Nuclear /.oe ; the other, New Tool:: for
I lanners and i'rogrammers. lj The RAND Corporation which had ^oeen
and publishing information OB the program budget since 195:
,
brought this concept to the attention of persons in trie incoming Kennedy
ministration who generally agreed that this might be the one way of
facilitatiii treatment, sis, and study of one large segment of the
United ndget, namely, the military components. ll
rior to 1961, military planning and budgeting were performed
^Novick, Program Bud ro ra and t daral
Budget, op. c it.
, p.
-^David Novick, (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation,
nDavid Novick, ;.ri in and History of Program Budgeting , (Santa







independently. Planning, the responsibility of the Joint of ? :taff
(JCS) ana the military departments, was accomplished in terms of
military forces and weapon systems, projected over a period of years.
Costs, generally speaking, -were not introdue. t natically, either
to test tile feasibility af the whole program or to evaluate the relative
merit of the allocation. Budgeting on the other limit*
total dollar estimates that the economy could or should hear. The
budgetary system identified cost by object classes or resource catego-
: (1) Military Personnel; (2) Operation and Maintenance; (3) Pro-
curement; (4) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; and (5)
Military Construction. In effect, the budget reflected inputs to the
fense Department and gave little indication as to possible outputs
such as Army divisions, Air Force wings or weapon systems and
tlltary forces.
The result was a gap. The ''required" forces always cost more
i t ainistration and Congres ^re willing to pay. The process
was unsystematic and wasteful and, in addition to providing unbalanced
forces, was a principal cause of service rivalry. General Maxwell D.
Taylor, Army Chief of Staff during the I _ . er - dministration,
resigned after polio utes concerning the future role of the Army
and the Ac ainistration policj tion. In his book,




Th. three services develop their forcer more or less in
isolation from each other, so that a force category such
strategic retaliatory fioro of contributions of
both the Navy and the Air Force, is never vi in the
at .... In ;>rds, we ^oc^ at our forces horizontal
think of c t function.-, but vie them vertically in
.
Other critics hoped that nore meaningful fiscal presentations
would permit reductions in th tense Lonal u
of resources. The House Appropriations Committee reported in 1.
that the Joint Chief: taff should look at joint missions and combine
capability, The following j »r, tl, ie Committee showed its
concern with th elication and false starts of research and development
ajor weapons were committed to full production prior to corn-
ion of evaluation. The Senate Preparedness and the
Committee on Government Operations in 1959 and i960 recommended
that, despite unification, testimony t the i960 budget never
con d, nor wer risions made, on a functional concerning
,
but were vie targets. . dditionallv
,
lack of forward plannb I failure to Lsh prioriti en
i poor business practic . I ce% >rt t t b at Govern-
ae horizons further into the future. 14




- r. ey. sit.
, . 4.
i4U.
. Congress, Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations, Hearings, E banning-A roeram ming-Budqetinr
:
,
; 1th Con .
.
:
, pp. 6fc -69.
I -r
McNamara in preparation for • >comia _retary of Defense read
rious Congression . orts and cil ally the ' on
Committee recommendation for Implementation of }
broad po In l Secretary of .
' i: ' Considering the
criticism of the present system and ''President Kenne ' instructions...
to (i) develop the force structure necessary to meet our military re-
quirements without regard to budget c Illns; and (2) procure and
operate this force at tl west possible cest,' : McNamara sought an
ltematlve so that he could allocate funds to the services on the basis
of the overall needs of national security and thus provide the country
with a balanced military posture.
Both McNamara ana Hitch realized that to make the really crucial
eisions concerning major forces and weapon ;.- terns, the financial
management area had to provide data upon which these decisions could
eased. It ..as clear that a new function woul ?e to be in-
corporated into the financial structure . Tl r proposed bj Hitch
In Q is called pro . . ince the militarj
planning function and th t function i tire II 2d,
role of program a the t . i ^









development and procurement time, ai >rmou place a tremend-
ous pre alum on 1 1 cti a pro* . - ; i > ae,
for the t of the Def<
around of th . 1?
•
! > Is •. r d for pr
,
and since
this function ts regarded as par the parameters
for Planning -Prograi ;lng« h .: (1) planning
around major a! ;sioi to grouping milit .
services separately; these mission-oriented forces constitute the
'outputs ' of th: ram; (2) ability to relate resource "inputs
'
to military "outputs"; this constitutes a time-phased requirement in
terms of physical units, such as manpower, equipment and facilities;
( ) coordination of long-range planning with budgeting to allov for
a to approved programs recognized or required during the budget
rev! r c 3; (4) continuous appraisal of programs since defense
planning must remain G md r to military need?; rather
1 annual budget cycle; ( fress reporting to assure
Ly, cor taken viations to
occur; (6) an ability to enal tudies
of alternal and (7) devel tn inte





requir :cs for information from the services. *'
i
.- I orce Structure and Financial Plan la an internal
Defense I epartm snt tool, though it I t ^oun^ation of the programming
.:, it does not re] roved programs of the U.S. Government.
Th; . reserves tc to authorize anc; appropriate
funds, y j year, against this propc. i - m, and sven th
.nt is not unalterabl five-year pro in
U, It Is, however, the roa _. It jstabl jrojects the
fercce for service for are and resource levels for
five years. - plan is formally approved by the Secretary of
e, it becomes binding for programming purposes on all components
of the Department,
The Five-Year Program can be described in term, of three
- jor bui] blocks:
1. M j«r . repj dentin ations of similar military
functic i tlitary services into
a brc I functional clas






- U.S. Department of Defense, . frjrfv Report on the Programming
.-•tern for the Office of the secretary of Defense. (Washington: Office
of the cant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), June 25, 1962),









IT, one , ratel . . since
It repr - . direct
atrol jt tfa sretarj of C .i n .
AH of \h ita, to .ription of tl
, their tasks and and can be
nmarized in different . B >aring - trix table containing
.ajor programs in :olnms h md th« traditional budget
ries (appropriations) in th FWe-Year Pr 3 can be
translated into budget terms and vice v 8 .
. I rovr3m :.l :aents are the forces, weapon (or support)
,
and similar typ - mte p L( - - 'lthin a major
or q . s an
le, the pro jra o •
taliator> Foj rs, Lir-to-ground and
tesil marine-
'or t r itr . 11
...-.,_.„.. institute
^Tucker, op. cit.
, pp. 92 an
20Novicl
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>utput of apartment. The forces are
projected eJ I i >nd t .a eura i&r, thr« ore than
rest of 1. ata. Ions are made
prograa 1 ctlvit> falls within one and only one
program el it, c ts are broken down Into three bi :ai ries:
earch and E 1 sat; Inv
:
>era1 . Under each of
ries are listed the bu< t appropriation accounts from
dch the progrs ie teat I financed. In this manner cost ted
to programs and forces can trapolat - rms.
. Resour^ij categories are the requlrt source inputs which
the pr its. There are four major resource
categories: (1) nt, (. ) manpower, (3) milit i in-
struction ana (4) the functions and aetiviti. .need under Operation
cenance appropriations. Just as in the case of progr
elements, the sun iree category • Q total resouri
input since every resource input fa] .u^i one and onl> one resource
category.
a;, in one com rehes rmat, I se-Year I )
Structure an Lai
forces an r ories and projected
over tim . U ti i I infer - to ,;. Hin ns
m provided to th sretai I tse ane principal military
;:i The Navy 1- r urn in:; h.anuol , Office of the Chief of N. I








ana civilian a< . T. -lance it --. r ma, pro-
grams ?ith force r iit.r
, and llitai .. . security .
its overall t on other s and
fore It - atten ant
Lnce the . . c system, a nge
that approved progr c Limits. This
the i ur is
1. that i channel i -on-makin :
. that proposed oh . Lve a . . but c , revfc
rnec:
. that progr clsions are made on the oasis of the best
in: mailable, inclu: ':. validation of their long-
ran • cost . .
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culmination of a major of
cost over tr nd c ' rnativ . 11
proposals a: i to tl tant ry of
! ) for re roposal Df s response for
the Secretary of
:, .Jyntne \
'From a small >eginnlng, systems analysis has now become a
vital ana integral part of the Defense Department decision-making
process. "-^
In t mber, 1985, the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Systems i nalysis) was established. Prior to this time analysis was a
function of the • of Defense (Comptroller). Tfc
creation of this office gave explicit recognition of t. iportance in
Lch systems analysis is vi t>y the Secretary of Defeni . Th
responsibilities, functions, ana authorities specified in the Implementing
•irective or charter are: (1) r^j] tive requirements, includJ






fore-:::;, japou t, *sonr ir i r\ of
Def . (2) I l ' i , Iding,









- and (4) t
the : cr v. ' ' : 11
DO] " In such




Recognition of tl vital role >f i analysis in the ion
process has spawned an : 'In Lit} not only in & i Dffice of
the Secretary of Def >ns , but In the Joint Chi iaff, tl &d-
quarters of t: Llitary departments, and at other 'ana-;' ment levels
of the defem i + ' ' nt. The Defefl spartan at also support.:- a
tber of o )s, as Indicated earlier, ' RANT for the
i :'r Fore 5,1 lysis Coi tl




pro:/ . ;:':'" ' : '
Q • t -Year
Plan. Thus,
2»U,S, Depart r for t.-:. . ..= . 1-t mt secretary







the Secretary of Defence now has all the tools he needs to take the
initiative in the planning and direction of the intire defense effort. *"
In summary then, the major considerations in program budgeting
are:
(1) Structural or format aspects concerned with establishing a set
of categories (a program and program element structure) orient
toward "end-product" or "end-objective" activities that are meaning-
ful from a long range planning point of view; The Five*Year Force
Structure and Financial Program.
(2) Analytical process considerations conducted as an integral part
of the program-budgeting process and within the framework
mentioned above to systematically examine alternative courses
proposed by Program Change Requests in terms of utility (benefit)
and cost to clarify the relevant choices.
(3) Information system considerations to support the first two
items, principally: progress reporting and control, to give in-
dication of how well (or poorly) major program decisions are
being carried out; providing data and information to serve as a
basis for the analytical process particularly to fsciliate the making
of estimates of benefits and costs of future alternative courses, of
action by means of a data bank of relevant information.
Ibid.
, pp. 57 and 5! .
,; F. H. Fisher, The * orld of Program Budgeting, (Santa Monica,






"People have tended to focus on the structural (format) and
progress reporting aspects, to the relative neglect of the analytical
part of the system. This, I think, Is a great mistake. Many of I
most important advantages of a program budgeting system cannot
realize rtiout setting up a solid analytical activity to generate and
specify alternative future courses of action,
Systems analysis is not synonymous with FFB, but as currently
practiced within the DOD, it constitutes one of the most important
elements. It provides the menu of choice for defense decision making;
it screens requests for change to the Five-Year Plan; and, through the
Office of Systems Analysis, prepares answers to the service components
for the Secretary of Defense on service requests. Its power to influence
defense decisions is obvious; not so obvious is the power to lay
decision by requirements for the conduct of additional study.
Hitch argues that.... "programming is possible, indeed has been
used, without systems analysis, and can achieve some of Its important
objectives— draer, consistency, and rough intuitive balance amon
programs— without it. 'l The natur* proposition invites the
conclusion that for truly effective programming, systems analysis is
necessary to provide the requisite equation between means and ends
—
"inputs" and 'outputs 1 '— budget 2nd program .
Ibid.




THE ESSENCE OF THE METHOD
'In the search for the truth of things method
is indispensable" — Descartes
/.n C verview
The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear /ge , written to explain
a way of looking at military problems, regards all military problems as
economic problems in the efficient allocation and use of resources. It
is concerned more with how to view military problems and how to go
about solving them than with the substantive solutions themselves. *
Three interrelated and interdependent approaches were considered: (1)
the improvement of institutional arrangements within the government to
promote efficiency, improve budgeting and accounting methods, provide
more appropriate incentives, and reorganize the apparatus of decision
making; (2) increase reliance on systematic quantitative analysis to
determine the most efficient alternative allocations and methods; and (3)
increase recognition and awareness that military decisions are economic
decisions, and that unless the right questions are asked, the appropriate






alternatives related for comparison, and an economic criterion used for
choosing the most efficient, military power and national security will
suffer. ^
In this economic approach to systems analysis, there is no unique
method to be followed, but there are several stages which might be
termed the "scientific method. '' In this context, the "scientific method,
"
is concerned more with the adoption of a posture of objectivity and the
raising of constructive criticism ana alternatives than with the traditional
viewpoint of pure science. Science does not rely on personalities,
reputations or vested interests, but rather on explicit calculations,
assumptions, data and judgments subject to verification, criticism, and
duplication of results by others. The stages of the scientific method
through which analysis must advance are: formulation; search; explanation;
and interpretation.
The formulation stage attempts to isolate the questions and issues
involved and to define the meaning of the- variables or factors which are
sonsidered relevant to the situation and to state the relationships among
these factors. This is the most important stage, for the time spent
restating the problem in different ways, redefining it, or expressing its
limits may indicate whether or not the matter under consideration is
-Ibid.
, p. 107.
3e. S. Quade (ed. ), Analysis for Military Decisions , (Saata Monica,




significant and point the way to its solution. An obvious point often
overlooked is the critical examination of the original proposal. Since
the concern is with the future, the major job may be to decide what the
policymaker should want to do.
The search stage is concerned with finding the facts, or evidence,
on which the analysis is based. It is necessary to look for ideas and
evidence to support them, including the invention of new/ alternatives.
Unless there are alternatives and ideas about them, there is nothing to
analyze or to choose between. Hitch indicates that an analyst makes his
greatest contribution by inventing new systems rather than by comparing
proposed systems. As an example, he cites the analysis for rapid
deployment of forces to trouble spots around the world. Early analysis
concentrated on aircraft since sealift was regarded as too slow to be a
competitor. From the outset, pre -positioning of men and equipment, or
equipment only, was recognized as an alternative and included in the
analysis. A serious problem of prepositioning is the difficulty of
acquiring real estate for the purpose in foreign countries, and the
likelihood that the propositioned stocks will be in the wrong country if
hostilities threaten or actually break out. Of secondary concern is the
changing political climate throughout the world and the balance of pay-
ments difficulty. So the analyst posed the question: why not pre-position










Victory ships loaded with Array equipment stationed in the stem
Pacific, current I n [nests includ funds for a new class of ship
,
the Fast Deployment Logistics ship patterned after the Roll-on /Roll- off
commercial carriers. The overall result is a more fie I; 1 e, greatly
expanded airlift, rapid-deployment llity. *
It is sometines true that in the gathering of facts the pr
solution may be found. More often, ver, all th re never
known. In some cases, the total possible alternatives may be r
and it then becomes necessary to limit the alternatives to tl >st
feasible in order to perform a meaningful study within the time and
resource constraints. Judgment on selecting alternatives, fact gathering
and knowing when to stop is a crucial and necessary concern. It Is out
of the question to collect all the information required for ustlve
analysis let alone process it.
The explanation ata^ attempts to order the facts and alternatives
logically to facilitate anamination of their implications. To nake
progress, a great mm, features ->f I question under study are ignored
le certain aspects, hopefully, the relevant ones, together with their
interactions are abstracted to make an idealised version of the real
situation. Th: alization is called a model. The difficulties of model
building are mamy; but not knowing at the start \ hat is superfl md
^Tucker, op. cit















tat ifl relevant is perhaps primary. ,11 the assumptions of the model
must be maae explicit in such a way that the response I ecision maker
can make his judgment based on the full range of relevant assumptions.
The interpretation stage la a critical examination of the result:
obtained from the model. This solution must be interpr light
of considerations which may not have been adequately treated by the
model, such as uncertainty and non-quantifiable factors. At this point
the process becomes iterative; the sponror Dr the real world attempts
to counteract the solution of the analyst, since the solution may not
necessarily a gooci answer to the original problem lue to oversimplifi-
cation, drastic idealization, and a atlon caused b\ the mathematical
format. 5
In areas such as defense planning, where there is no accepted
theoretical foundation, advice obtained from experts rises largely from
judgment and intuition. Similarly, systems analysis depenc nt
ana intuition, but combines the contrieutions of experts in many fields
to yield results superior to any ordinary individual or committ . The
essence of the method is to construct ana operate within a model, vhich
may be a computer simulation, a war famej or a purely verbal scenario.
The purpose is to introduce a precise structure and terminology for the







context, in proper relation to each ather using a C( n media of
communication. utilization of feedback concepts, the problem becomes
regenerative and the rts can v> irlier judgment; I thus
arrive at. a clearer understanding of the problem and its conte
The significance of the can be appreciated most by lookin
at its relation to the other elements of analysis. ry analysis
of choice, although not alv explicitly Ified, ire five common
racteristics:
1. The objective (or objectives ). I n ten
primarily to choose a policy or course of action. The first and
most important task of the analyst is to discover what the object-
ives of the decisionmaker are (or should be) and how to tell the
extent to which they are, in fact, attain various actions.
This done, strategies, forces, or equipment are examined, com-
pared, and recomm on tin : &ell an ply
they can accomplish these objectives,
2. The alternatives . The alternatives are the maans by which it
is hoped the objectives can be attained. They need not be obvious
substitutes for on ither of perform the same specific function.
Thus shelters, ''shooting'' defenses, a counterforce capability,
and retaliatory striking power .11 alternatives in protecting
civilians against tir attack.
• The casta
. The choice of a part' aula r altemativ \ for accom-
plishing the objective implies that certain specific resources can
no longer be used for other purposes* T 1 osts. In
analyses for a future time period, most costs can be measured
in money, but th Ir leasur is In t of the opportunltl t
they preclude. Thus, if we are comparing ways to suppress
guerrillas, the damage to nonparticipants ilterm -
tives must be considered a cost, for such damage may recruit
mar- aarrlir .
4. /: model (or models). A model is a simplified, stylized rep-
resentation of the real world which abstracts tb -• iffect
relationahips essential to the question studied. The means of
representation may run s from et of latical equations or
a computer program to a purely verbal description of the situation,
in which intuition alone is used to predict the con ces of
.Oi '
various choices, 1 lor \U& of choice),
the role of the model (or models, for it may be inappropriate or
absurd to attempt to - ; :- all problem in
a single formulation) is to estimate for each alternative the cost.
that wou] Lncurre i and th I I tile I ''
be attained. This requires a measure of effectiveness or means
for Indicating th of achievement Tor each goal,
--* ^ criterion . A criterion is a rule or standard by which to
rank the altern: tlv s In order I "' >ose th
most promising. It provides a means for weighing cost against
effectiv ;>. . 6
pending en the nature of the pri i nc, th
In the analysis may be formal or inform. 1, aatical or c od-
lOj and may cr . ,, not rely on u . . ".. point
is that th I not b< '1; formal or EuL
It must be remembered that model buildia an art, .,
: is often experim nt 1. The - purpose In I 1 is
to develc mingful set of relations tives as t
relevant alternatives available for attaining the
the estim ; Lt ' .' raati . i .
Conceptual Consideration.'
The basic premise that military decisions are economic decision
recognizes that military wants are limited by the scarcity of resources,
otherwise each service could have all of everything it desired and ther
would be no need to exercise choice. Since th-.-. re resource con-
straints, in general there are two principal conceptual approaches:
®E, '.
,
Military .,-.nal, ta Monica, Calif,: The RAND





I. Fiv.ed utility -mproach . lor pecified level of utility to be
attained in the accomplishment of some given objective, the
analysis attempts to determine I ilternative (or feasible co -
bination of alternatives) likely to achieve the specified level of
utility at trie lowest economic 201 1.
. Fixed budget approach . For a specified budget level to be used
in the attainment of some given objective, the analysis attempts to
determine that alternative (or feasible combination of alternatives)
likely to proauce the highest utility for the given t level,
The fixed level of utility or budget i; usually specified meoiie
outside the analysis and it usually is a given datum to the t. \A:r\
Often several levels may be used to investigate trie sensitivity of the
ranking of tee alternatives to utility or budget level, The char
istimes mace that the fixed ^u^jot approach violates the principal
of calculating the si^e of defence programs on the basis of military
need rather than as limited o> a fi 1. However , there is
nothing in t td budget analysis approac tea th< et
level as the final criteria of program size. Obviously Level of the
budget selected for the analysis should provide a rational level of
effectiveness. Otherwise th d costs of the program may distort
results. hen the study is conducted at the level of some reason-
fi ed budget, the end result data on the marginal cost
of adding increment: of effectiveness. If necessary, the decision-maker
can then make a reasonable adjustment in the final budget level to
achieve the effectiveness desired. If a program is being anal in
?G. H. Fisher, Xbts arid of ^ronm,^ Fiukc-tinn, t lea,




.vhich the objectives and degree of effectiveness desired is quite clear,
then this is of course a strong argument for holding this element fi.
during analysis, but in principle either approach is accepts 1 .
Uncertainties t itn syst ns analysis are usually divided
into two categories: real and statistical, nach affects the outcome in
the same sense mathematically, but the nature of each is quite; different.
!
'In the long run, ' Lord Keynes said, ., shall all be dead;" the point
to be made is that we cannot afford to ignore uncertainty from our
ignorance of the future.
Real uncertainty reflects the unknowns surrounding the state of
the world in the future. This class of uncertainty consists of four
major elements: (1) planning and cost factor uncertainty, (2) Strategic
uncertainty, (3) technological uncertainty, and (4) uncertainty about the
enemy and his reactions. 9
Every model uses certain input relations known as ''planning
factors"— for example, the average number of hours a cargo plane
can be used in a day. In any particular analysis, it is never possi
to calculate everything from scratch. As a consequence, plannic
factors are borrowed from other analyses of varying quality together
with their biases. Invariably the factors are discrete values rather
c Hitch and McKean, op. cit.
, pp. 166-1 .
Sjbid.
, p. i





than a range or probability distribution, rage values are not
necessarily wrong, but the uncertainty of the variation should be rec-
ognized. Cost estimating is an approximate art even in the best-run
businesses. There are numerous examples of weapon systems where
cost estimates were exceeded by factors of ten or modifications that
doubled systems cost. ^
Strategic uncertainty addresses the problem of the context in
which the next war will take place. The timing of the war, it. tent,
the availability and participation of allies, the use of nuclear weapons,
and the political power relation ships between nations are but a few of
the dubious, but necessary concerns of this imponderable. 1]-
The technological revolution, wherein conservative estimates state
that 95% of the known inventions were conceived within the last 130
years, shows ever) evidence of continuing. The controversial TF:
which v/ill be treated in a later chapter, emoodies revolutionary
technology and is already three years behind schedule. Expert guesses
about the dates of operational missile systems have varied as much as
ten years. *2
Perhaps the most perplexing uncertainty concerns the enemy and













program is never good-in- itself, but only gooci-in-relation-to the tactics,
strategy, forces, and future weapon systems of an enemy. Intelligence
about an enemy is always less than perfect as experience in Vietnam
attests. The difficulty in predicting when an enemy will achieve a
certain capability when we cannot predict our own success with infinitely
more knowledge of our progress, is indicative of the difficulty. Of even
greater concern and more fundamental than ignorance of enemy capability,
is ignorance of enemy intent or strategy. 1 '-
Statistical uncertainty
,
the uncertainty resulting from the chance
element in recurring events, persists even if enemy strategy and the
central value of all important problem parameters were known. It is
the uncertainty about which books on probability theory are written.
Unfortunately, in most practical problems, the real uncertainties dominate
the statistical uncertainties. l4
Since most decision problems are concerned with future events and
uncertainty, analysis of such problems must provide explicit treatment
of uncertainty. Statistical uncertainty can be handled by Monte Carlo or
other techniques to deal with these fluctuations; but these deviations are
often dominated by real uncertainty in long-range planning problems.
Dealing with statistical uncertainty in such problems is nothing more













long-range plannia real uncertainty prevails are sensitivll
contlngencyi and a fortiori analysis. 1*
In sensitivity analysis, several values may b I turn,
lo ), rather than one expected value in order to see hev; sensitive
the alternative would be to variation?,- in the uncertain parameter. In
contingency analysis, an Investigation is to see how the relative
ranking of alternatives holds up by assuming changes in the environment
or evaluation criteria. (For eple, if the enemy is assumed to be
Red China and North Vietnam, what would happen if Cambodia and Laos
joined the coalition.) In a fortiori analysis, if Intuitive judgment favors
one alternative, the analyst can-, leap or deliberately favor another
alternative. If the first alternative still look od under adver
conditions, it makes a strong case for the first alternative. 16
Problem objected to analysis more often than not will be
dynamic, or will have lie aspects to them. One alternative may
be better today tl , but over time the opposite could be equally
true. If the decision maker is not indifferent concerning time preference,
then cost of the several alternatives to be "discount
appropriate rate which can be a problem in itself. In any event, time
oects further complicate the analysis if only by addition of another
1^Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann, Ten Common Pitfalls, (Santa











An often neglected, but necessary consideration involves checking
icdel to determine whether the analytical procedure used Is a good
representation of reality. This may well prove difficult, particularly
in problems with time horizons five or more years into the futur ,
An integral part of the total analysis involves these qualitative
considerations which could not be handled quantitatively in the model as
well as those qualitative aspects which supplement the quantitative work.
These subjective considerations must be made explicit to the decision-
maker in the same manner as all other assumptions and simplifications
ie necessary in the construction of the model.
From the above description, attempts to apply a "scientific method'^
to problems of economic choice within a military concext can treme-
lycomplex. The strengths and limitations of such a systematic an I
will be discussed subsequently, the main points presented may
summarized as follows:
1. Since comparative analysis is the prime focus, it is vitally
important to continually emphasize objectivity and con icy in
t te analytical concepts, methods, and tec s used.
2. Alternatl eing consio, t and those created during analysis
must be treated in an unbiased mann .









4. The primary purpose of analysis is not to make the decision,
but to sharpen the intuition ana ju f the decision makers.
5. Proper structuring of the problem is all-important. The study-
must be addressed to the right question:..
6. Assumptions, uncertainty, I non- quantitative aspects of the
problem must be made explicit so that the .stylized model will not
be eonfui . ..ith the real world it is attempting to simulate.
7. The model should be checked for validity of the analytical
procedure and exercised to assure that it can describe kno
facts and situations reasonably veil.
l. tilla cost-utility analysis stresses the quantitative methods,
the analyst should supplement his quantitative work with appropri-
ate qualitative analyses. l c-
Intangibles and Incommensurables
No matter how skillful the analysis, in problems of choice with
great uncertainty, particularly military choice, there will be consider-
ations of a subjective nature. Certain aspects of the problem or of
the alternatives being compared cannot be quantified and translated into
common values. If the value is money, items which cannot be evaluated
in dollars by any objective and generally acceptable method are
IfclblcU





Suppose that the preferred (minimum-cost) method of achieving
the objective is expected to involve the loss of more lives than another
alternative even after including the investment of time, money, and
equipment of the additional men. For several reasons, we might be
concerned about this. The higher casualties may adversely affect the
morale of other forces in a manner not anticipated, although the
casualties were explicitly considered during the analysis. The intangible
character of a factor such as morale is almost impossible to evaluate.
More importantly, the potential loss of human life poses a vexing
problem. We are interested in saving lives for their own sake.
Fewness of casualties is an objective in planning any military operation
that is not fully compensated for by computations on the cost of replace-
ments. One military solution may cost less materially but more in
lives, but before we can rationally decide between such programs, in
theory at least, a valuation must be placed on human life.
Many other examples of incommensurables are frequently encounter-
ed in military problems. In addition to the many factors which affect
morale, we may encounter side-effects in building capability to fight one
type of war when another type is the more likely; the political effects of
decisions concerning actions such as the cancellation of Skybolt or the
^Hitcb and McKean, op. cit.









r iuction of NATO forces in V estern Europe; the provocative effect of
building a 'thin" ABM defense shield; the calculated risk of Intelligence
gathering by U-2 (lights or coastal surveillance by electronically equipped
ships such as the Pueblo.
There are several ways to handle incommensurable8 in quantitative
analysis. One way is simply to icnore them. Te commonly, th
are explicitly stated, then ignored. ometimes it is ted that, if
the analyst works hard enough, everything can be put in terms of a
common unit. B*^ As an example, court decisions awarding sums of
money under insurance claim s for loss of life or discounting to present
value the anticipated future net earnings of an Individual could be useful
in particular problems, but none provide a generally valid and appropri-
ate measure of "the" value of human life. Perhaps, more germane to
the discussion is the fact that peacetime values are irrelevant in time
of war or that court decisions are influenced by factors not inherent in
the circumstances of the particular case— emotions of the jurors reflect-
ing bias against insurance companies or rationalizing the ability of the
insurance company to pay.
No one answer will suffice in the consideration of incommensura-
bles and intangibles; they exist and must be explicitly displayed and








their existence. If thej serve no other purpose, they may stimulate
the analyst to invention of a more satisfactory alternatlv .

CHAPTER IV
N APPRAISAL OF THE METHCD
"There is no good without ill in the world, but
everything is mixed in due proportion. M — E uripides 1
The Limitations and ' eaknes ses
General agreement exist:- that systems analysis or cost-effective -
ness techniques are most useful when the objective or output is definitely
fixed; that is, when there is only one dependent variable, and the sole
task is to minimize costs which are readily and accurately measured.
In such cases, alternative means to achieve the objective differ only in
this key variable, and choosing the cheapest mean." in this sense is the
only problem.
alternatively , it is just as geneieall} reed that the approach is
less useful in clarifying choices when the employment of different means
leads to appreciably different results. Its usefulness is even mo-
restricted, the more incommensurable the input factors and the more
appreciable and unmeasurable the social, moral, and political costs
other than those quantifiable in dollar terms. In other words, the
usefulness of the technique is more limited, the less the problem is







capable of uniform quantification. This limitation is quite abvlous sin
rational decisionmaking is based upon the maximization of all benefits
minus the value of all costs or disadvantages. Additionally, 1 e ful-
ness of the method depends on the completeness with which the costs
and benefits are analyzed.
Other than dollar costs are often crucial and easily lost sight of.
Political costs can become dominant, as when the particular choit
causes great inconvenience to an ally such as the cancellation of the
yoolt missile in December, 1962. This decision almost toppled the
government of Prime Minister Macmillan, since the British had modified
their bomber fleet in anticipation of tto eapon. The costs of alterna-
tive missiles for the Vulcan bomber were equally prohibitive to the
British, Finally, Britain was offered Polaris missiles for her nuclear
submarines as a paliative in the Nassau Pact. iuently, President
de Gaulle rejected the Nassau Pact and the Polaris missile offer an
.ckballed Britain from the European Economic Community. 2 it can
be argued that these costs were explicitly considered when Skybolt was
ncelled, but who could have predicted the final consequences':
Equally crucial are military decisions when choice engenders a
arp decline in morale. The controversial TFX multi-service fighter-







stween Bo^in g and General Dynamics by military evaluation teams.
After each competition, the Boeing n ;;as judged superior. "Then,
to the chagrin of many, the surprise of some, and the cynical expecta-
tions of quite a few, McNamara .... overruled the military evaluators
and announced that General Dynamics had won the competition."
The full ramifications of this decision may never be known; serious,
perhaps irreparable, harm was done to the faith and confidence of
service ana contractor personnel in the selection process. There is
small satisfication to rained from a LCD directive establishin
Source ;' election evaluation Board two ry 9ar s after the TFX contract
was awarded to General Dynamics over service protests. *
Problems for system? analysis aJte frequently important, urgent,
and difficult. Consider the problem of d lining a strategic force
posture. It is not only important from a military viewpoint but equally
from an economic one, since the cost of modern missile and aircraft
systems dictate efficiency in their acquisition. It is urgent, for national
security ma
;
. rest on its solution. The many and diverse factors
racing the skills of engineerin \ sconon politics, psychology as
well as military science are almost dwarfed by the conditions of
uncertainty, the time and money to make them operational, and the
•:
-Tom Alexander, "McNamara's Expensive Economy Plane,"
Fortune, (June 1, ), p. id.
^"Proposal evaluation and Source Selection," DCD Directive




.ill and intelligence of the enemy. The magnitude and complexity of
the problem provides ample latitude for error on the part of the
systems analyst.
The "attention or party line has been described as "the
most important single reason for the tremendous miscalculations that
are made in fore and preparing for technical advances or chan
in the strategic 'ituation. ** This weakness is insidious in nature and
prone to exist in any organization. The party line can : influen-
tial in shaping the early stages of a etudy. If the project sponsor por
a problem in certain ways or if spread beliefs ar j that he is
adverse to certain approaches, then the range of alternatives may be
limited from the out . s analysis groups workin ithin the
ieten stabllshm sot tend to tike on the philosophical coloration of
msorin • organizations, if for no other reason than that they
are exposed to the same environment and influences." hat
can happen Is that, daring the early cycles of a study, the analysts
i successive revk come aware that some of the alternatives
or certain assumptions being considered are frownec on by higher
ranking officers. Appearing useless, even hazardous, to support
unpopular views stron I , i @y are given is nphasis or forgott
entirel . fter a period of successful work, a /Toup of analysts
DKahn and Mann, op. cit.
, p. 42.
°Hitch, ''Decision- Making for I .," op. cit.









may become so entrenched in an organization that they lose their
objectivity and Independence of view. » The cliches, "maintain the
tus quo" — don't rock the boat" -- "discretion Is the better part
of valor, ; all apply.
thin the present DOD decisionmaking process itself, a [rowing
apprehension that c Iveness studies ar:.> a bias favoring those
proposals so supported is quite obvious. The growth of the "think"'
Industry and the number of universities and commercial concerns
conducting systems analyses is impressive. Klaus Knorr and Oskar
Mor.! eastern of the Center for International Affairs, Princeton University,
questioned ... aether the: recent emphasis on cost-effectiveness may
not be too tiel of a good thin . They went on to say:
Elmittedly, sophisticated cost-effectiveness studies played
too small a role until Mr. McNamara oecame Secretary of
there are fairly widespread feelings that its
present role may be excessive and constitute an over-reaction
to \ , revious lack.
T:. jo;t--;ffectiven tudies are valuable in comparing
liar weapon systems, but they question taeir utility in ehoo
between dissimilar . :apon 85 , since they m ct as too sharp a
brake on the innovating process that is concerned with radically new
as. ' The conservative favoring Id has been widely criticized.
?E. ". uade, Eome Comments on Cost-Effectiveness
, (
nica, Calif. : The REND Corporation, March, 1965), p. 8.




The relatively stable level of research and development spending over
this period conceals a significant shift in emphasis, away from innovation
ana toward refinement of existing weapon systems. The U. S. has chosen
not to maintain the initiative, while the U. 8. S, R. has visibly bent every
effort toward seizing it.
Enthoven recognizes the pro I last the new, but feels
that the method of Dpen explicit analysis is superior to reliance on juo;
meat and intuition or experience unsupported by analysis. In explanation,
assert* that:
The reason for the bias is that we all tend to compare the
old and the new in the current mission that happens to have been
optimized for the old... The nev. sp t char Its
initial investment as well as operating costs, while the old system
is only charged its operating cost. I . . . plead guilty to this
accusation but insist that this is not an unfair bias. Rather, it
is the correct procedure for a rational equipment replacement
policy. The point is that our objective, in selecting the rate of
r. i piacement of weapons and ships, should not be to Lmize the
degree of newness in the forces. It should be to maximize the
total effectiveness we get out of the resources available for
defense.
Charles echultze, former Director of the Bureau of the Budget,
testifying before the Jackson subcommittee in August, 1967, was questioned
if it is desirable to systematize the generation of facts so carefully and
an such carefully defined patterns and limits that a bias is introduced
ich precludes dissent, inquiry and perhaps controversy. In qualifyin
rci J. V halen, "The Shifting Equation of Nuclear Defense,"
Fortune
,






the question, Senator Jackson s that the decision told
everything which went into tfe ;>ut not ' 1 I In
reply, Schultze stated;
I don't think that the answer to U of not having
all of the right kind of facts or all of the right kind of analyses
'Let us scrap analysis, a? I think I
would worry a little more about the fact that at present the
decision od thi , are makii Ions
in the dark. As a general proposition of the Government, that
problem is more of a difficulty than the fact that in building a
systematic analysis, without having all the advocates in there,
you may build som ' into it. von't den is
a problem, it seems to me it is the lesser worry ,vhen you are
disposing of $135 Billion worth of resources and makin "ions
affecting the security of a nation. I would much rather have a
system which gives me an i Is, even though I have to be
careful to make sure it isn't biased, than not to have an analysis
at all... As a neral proposition, the probl- sldent
and Cabinet heads ano the Congress is that they are usually
presented with !'yes' ! or "no" decisions, and not tern tives.
No'\, your problem is the alternatives may themselves
biased. That may very well b . I car": ' :
nalyses that cio bias the alternatives. 11
From the f in-, It would appear that the first step, and,
perhaps, the most effective one, to olimin Las is to recognise that
it is likely to exist. Secondly, the analysis should be critiqued by
ople with a different viewpoint or set of cherished beliefs, preferably
wn from outside the organization.
> nalysis is necessarily incomplete . Time and money costs place
obvious limits on how far an innuiry can be pursued. The annua' et
J-lSubcommitt Committee on Government Operation
,
Hearings, j-lanning -r-roaramming-Budgeting 90th Cong. , 1st Sess.
,
Tf Testimony presente - Charles L. Schultze, pp. 40-41,
adi
I
I n .( t: .
'
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cycle invokes a natural cutoff and any Program Change Requests in
process after August I are not processed as PCR's but are incorporated
in the budget review process. Due to the number of PCR's submitt
ana the requirement for full justification including cost-effectiveness
studies, the PCR system has not worked smoothly. ^
analysis car never treat all t consider ..ions that may be relevant.
Some are intangible such as Congressional reaction to decisions on base
closings and decisions affecting the status of the National Guard. "Partly
resulting from time pressure, cost-effectiveness studies are fragmentary,
... all costs and benefits do not receive due attention, and . . . mon
costs claim undue emphasis. To put it more crudely, we may b.
too many cost studies and not enough cost-benefit studies
overemphazing money costs . . . just pretend to be cost-effectiveness
studies. " i6 The very fact that time moves on means that a correct
choice at a given time may soon be outdated by events and that goals
set down at the start may not be final. f; Historically, by far the most
important reason for poor cost estimates is that the system configuration




"-Klaus Knorr, ' Cn the Cost-Effectiveness Approach to Military







time the system became operational. ! 14
One basic weakness in cost studies has bees inadequate cost-of-
ownership analyses and trac^-off decisions. DOD has no data bank of
such information and most cost-effective .. studies today rely on
assumptions. Yet ownership comprises approximately 35 percent of
total life cycle costs. 15 Closely allied to this area of weakness is
the use of cost estimates of one study to become an input to subsequent
studies. .Although the estimate may have been valid in it; original
application, it is frequently less so in later applications.
:.en ^ireat uncertainty exists to the most probable cost of a
system, the service sponsor who is under pressure to "sell" his
proposal, will take as his single estimated value the lower end of a
range of possible values. This could be termed gamesmans* : ;<: , ut
in the political arena, the sponsor must show his system tc >:tter
than other systems. 18 It may be convenient to forget how far pre-
vious have missed the mark in the past. For example, estimates
of the cost of production are seldom within a factor of 2 (20 ,5) of
tual cost, and not uncommonly, are off by factors of 5 to 13.
i4 M. V. Jones, System Cost i nalysis: A Management Tool for
Decision Making, " (Bedford, Massachusetts: The Mitre Corporation,
November, 1085), p. 50.
l^Faul V. Croke, (et al), "Lessons Learned from Contract
inition, (Boston, Massachusetts: Pea.': ..k Management Systems
Company, August, 1965), p. 11.
!SJones, op. cit.






Similarly, slippages in time to operational status of fr to 5 years
are not unusual. Performance parameters are generally more accurate,
but even here differences of 25 percent from original estimates are not
uncommon.-1-'' "In most long -ran I ruling problems where major
uncertainties are present, quantitative differences among alternate
must be at least a factor of two before we can even begin to have any
confidence that the differences are significant.
Measures of effectiveness are approximate . Usually the contc
in which analyses takes place is fairly broad, often very broad, and
the environment very complex with numerous interaction;- among the
key variables in the problem. This means that simple, straightforward
solutions are the exception rather than the rule. / nalysis cannot treat
all relevant factors, it always leaves much to the j; nt and intuition
of the decision maker. At best, calculations by themselves give us,
for each set of specific assumptions about the political and economic
state of the world, the actions of the enemy or the outcome of various
technological investigations, I ewhat less than objective appraisal of
the effectiveness, for a fixed cost, of proposed forces or weapons
ininc; given
. "The analyst must clearly understand that any
nalysiE for Military Decisions, ' op. cit.
, p.
^ fisher, op. cit.
, p. 25.
19l. , uade, Some Comments on Cost-Effectiveness, (Santa













effectiveness model .«. abounds In uncertainties. As systems become
more cornpie ... there is less chance for his models to be quantitative
and more chance for his models to be based upon judgments. "
In the nuclear stalemate that this country is trying to achieve
with Russia, deterrence is one of the prime objectives. Deterrence
exists onlv ^ the rnind of the enemy. To achieve this objective, v
must not only have the weapons and the assured means for their
delivery but we must convince the Russians that not only do we have
the capability but that we are prepared to use it. Since we cannot
read the mind of a potential enemy, how can we measure the effective-
ness of the deterrent'. Or perhaps equally challenging, ,vill e point be
reached, where our nuclear might Is : weak or so stro: ither
'.. s potential enemy to take the calculated risk of a first
strike '. usee postulates that the effectiveness of alternatives leading
to deterrence cannot be measured directly. He indicates that if t
systems -were being compared and one could inflict 50 percent more
casualties on \ >ther, we coula not conclude that
this means t stem supplies 50 percent more deterrence. 'In fact,
in some circumstances, we find arguments that the system which
threatens the ereatest number of casualties may provide the least
. lordick, an Introduction to System Effectiveness, (Santa
aica, Calif.: The R/^ND Corporation, er 1965), p. .
j
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deterrence 1 '21 To create deterrence we must publicize the capability
of our deterrence; how the enemy interprets this capabilit when
cannot do so ourselves is still another imponderable. "It is little
..nder that cost analysts are unenthusiastic about imputations that
rest on effectiveness measur . Yet these imputations do not introduce,
but merely underscore, an analytic difficulty of effectiveness measures. "22
No satisfactory way to preaict the future exists. Since this is so,
analysis must consider a range of possible futures or contingencies,
common failing in developing proposals for new forces or weapons is to
concentrate technical competence and military expertise on a system
that will be most effective in the environment expected to exist at some
future time. The real problem is to provide a range of alternatives to
confront a spectrum of fi events. A look at past policies of
massive retaliation and ^urategic bombin tth a concomitan /mphasis
in tactical air and conventional ground forces proves the folly of one
view of the future.
.11 analysis of choice falls short of scientific research. !! It
cannot be empliasized too strongly that a (if not the) distinguishing
characteristic of systems analys: that the objectives are either not
• • nade, Cost n,ffectiveness: /n Introduction ana Overview
,












known or are subject to change. "28 Human judgment I ercised
throughout the process of recommending courses of action. To
workable models of the probl >.nv assumptions have to be made,
host of intangible considerations must be taken into account, and crucial
variables may not be quantifiable; as a consequence, uantlftable aspects,
particularly monetary costs, achieve a dominance. The practice of
reporting very precise numbers connotes a psueao accuracy because it
implies a depth and precision of knowledge that in most ca imply
does not exist. Quade summarises that:
"... an analysis may, on trie surface, appear so scientific
and quantitative that it may be assigned a validity not justified by
the many subjective judgments involved. In other words, we may-
be so mesmerized by the beauty and precision of the numbers
that we overlook the simplifications made to achieve thi^ precision,
neglect analysis of qualitative factors, and overemphs the
importance of idealized calculations to the decision process . .
.
ven after noting these dangers and deficiencies, systems analysis
y still look like a purely rational approach to decisionmaking,
coldly objective, scientific method free of the human attribut
of preconceived ideas and partisan bias and judgment and intuition.
Sy lysis may look like the scientific method applied to
cisionmaking. It isn't.
Some of the other weaknesses in this approach to decisionmaking
are procedural fallacie . Very briefly these involve allowing top
management to define the problem, t criterion, and impose unrealistic
budget or utility parameters which unduly restrict the study. Failure
to allow sufficient time for adequate study or undue use of computers
ildavsky, op. cit.
,








to optimize costs mechanically to achieve or create a criterion.
Recognizing a bias in the system against the new, a tendenc
to refine or increase the investment in the proven system and to utilize
previously successful studies to resubmit follow* proposals. Since
much of analysis is creative, restrictions which It the range or
depth of the study should be viewed as areas of potential weakne;. .
It is easy for the t to become more interested in the model
than the problem itself. This is a human weakness of highly train,
people in using their talents to the utmost, to focus attention on the
mechanics of the computation or in the technical relationships of the
moael rather than on the important questions raised in the study. In
this manner, they may discover a great deal about the inferences the
model may provide, but very little about the question they set out to
answer. Equally serious is the assumption that if the work of manipulat-
ing the model is done correctly, systems analysis is unlimited in tl
advice it can supply the decisionmaker. 25
ethoven cites a danger often criticized in the systems analysis
approach — confusing performance with effectiveness. He admits that
a narrow edge in performance, such as the speed of an aircraft, can
have a significant in on effectiveness, also that this problem is
uade, --Qme Problems - d wit ; analysis
,









not confined to systems analysis alone.
Last and of considerable import to the success of any analysis —
the results are limited by the caps lllties of the people performing the
study, The axperience ... clearly indicates that a nominal inter-
disciplinary approach is inadequate. The individual scientist, engineer,
and technician must become an integrated team—Interacting in a common
environment on a day-to-day basis with a common proclem-oriented
focus
. . . The development of this capability is a hard-won, time-
consuming and a costly process . . . The language and conceptual
barriers are both large and real. "27 It Is :utter for conjecture,
at »hat point the team, by working in a close environment, acquires
its own bias and oases to function as an objective problem -solvi
roup.
The Benefits
In view of the many defects and limitations, serious question-
raised concerning the usefulness of sms analysis. Invariabl
the criticism concerns specific applications, some of which will be
iored in the next chapter. Beyond the criticism, strong, crowing
expertise has developed both in the military and civilian components of
lain C. Lnthoven, "The Systems Analysis Approac i, ' (Presen-
tation prepared for the Special Subcommittee on the Utili of
mtific Manpower, Senate Labor and Public I aittee, I
Congress , ! Ion, Nay 17, i960), p. 5.
2?Thomas C. Rowan, Systems Analysis: Problems, Progress, and
Potential
,
(Santa Monica, Calif.: Systems Development Corporation,
Dctober 1966), p. .
•• in
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DOD and the think" community. Some of th; undoubtedly
been a tactical necessity as Sellgman points out, the services "be
been actively developing systems-analysis capabilities of their own, so
that, to caricature the situation only slightly, they will be able to slug
it out with Enthov ill's boys on more even terms. " However, even
within the service?, there Is a growing recognition of the benefits of
knowing the cost and impact of various decisions on future capability
and flexibility.
Between pure intuition and hunch on one hand and cost-effectiveness
analysis on the other, there are sources of advice that can be employed
to assist a decisionmaker. One alternative is l> fc a trul\
unbiased one may be hard to find; another i£ the us€ of co a mitt
Jokes abound on committees but they do perform a vital function in
many areas. However, committees usually reach a finding by bargaining
and th licit r loyed U lost in the proc -o that a
solution is structure th one point of vi
In systems analysis, through the framework of the model, iar
aber of experts can focus on a problem and its alternative solutions.
Inetead of one solution or recommendation, they can present the
dec! taker with a r: . >f possibility plaining the relative
tan, op. cit
. , p. 11 .




costs and benefits of each. By disclosing the method, assumptions,
uncertainties and risks, the decisionmsi. Iter understand^
of the total problem. In this manner analysis may si a the intuition
and broaden the basis for judgment of the decisionmaker.
Systems analysis falls short of being scientific research becau
its predictions ordinarily cannot be verified and the urgency of military
problems forces the substitution of intuition and assumption for verifia
knowledge "But in contrast, to other aids to decisionmaking, it
extracts everything possible from scientific meth. md its virtues
-re the virtues of those methods. "30 Furthermore, kno I -f the
limitations of systems analysis is shared by the experts, committees
ana others involved.
One of the most significant oenefits of cost-effectivene:;:: studies
is the possible break through or invention of a new alternative that
satisfies the objectives in a manner judged superior to the original
proposals. The increase in airlift capability \ the concept of pro-
positioned cargoes in ships strategically positioned throughout the uorla,
I prime example.
The most significant benefit may 11 that systems an lysis
»s not accept the given objectives, but ask^ to
ne — not simply how to do it.
Some Comments on Cost-Lffectivenesr '.t.
,
p. 14.
nalysis for Military Decisions, :: op. cit
.













SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AHD THE CONGRESS
"... great ideas have a way of degenerating into
petty techniques. " — Charles Peguy
The Concern
Prior to the arrival of Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of
Defense, the alliance of the military and the Congress was a traditional
feature of the Washington scene. :ien the military had been rebuffed
their civilian superiors, they turned to Congress, who with statutory
responsibility for raising and maintaining the armed forces, together
with the power of the purse to influence the size and disposition of such
forces, often reshaped Defense decisions. Additionally, with the
mandate to hold investigations and with access to subordinate as well
as senior officials of the Department of Defense, Congress could
inquire behind the scenes for motivating strategies. It is eminently
clear, however, that the role of the Congress in determining national
policy and defense policy, in particular, has deteriorated since 1961.
The tools and techniques installed within the Pentagon to gain master}
over the military, indirectly provided the means to master the Congress
67
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in almost as complete a fashion.
To summarize, the tools which comprise the basic system are:
(1) the Defense Reorganization Act of 19 5c which gave the Secretary of
Defense the authority to go with the responsibility for running his
department, (2) aligning the armed forces by mission under PPB from
the traditional division of land, sea, and air or Army, Navy, and Air
Force and (3) rationalized defense planning of missions and forces
supported by cost-effectiveness studies to provide the basis for decision-
making. Each of these tools has tended to remove the power of
decision from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries and
concentrate it in the hands of the Secretary of Defense assisted by the
Office of Systems Analysis through which all requests for change are
costed out.
PPB worked remarkedly well in three different respects:
It . . . provided the Secretary with a much clearer and more
meaningful representation of the department's vital functions than
was ever previously available, and it . . . enabled him to relate
and compare competitive and complementary activities much more
readily than by examination of separate Service budgets drawn up
according to the traditional accounts. The system also gave a
sense of order and perspective to the annual budgetary cycle with
its emphasis on a five-year plan and change proposals. Above
all, it provided a common format and language for the Services
and obliged them to think in terms of major missions of interest
to the department as a whole rather than simply of their own
separate functions. "-1-










Committee and the House and Senate Arm rvices Committees,
largely determined the Defense budget from testimony given by the
services and, in a manner of speaking, played one service against the
other. The hearings provided the members of Congress a means of
developing judgments on which to base legislation; and they offered, in
one form or another, an accounting to the American people of the
policies and programs that guide the armed forces. The average
Congressman who was not a member of one of the important committees
could not possibly cast an intelligent vote on a measure as complicated
as the Defense budcret. Because of the admitted shortcomincrs of this
system, Congress on several occasions recommended change. 'In two
letters to the Secretary of Defense in 1959, Representative George
Mahon, (D. Tex. ) then Chairman of the House I i Appropriations
Subcommittee, stressed the importance of looking at the Defense
programs and budget in terms of military missions by grouping progra
and their cost by mission. He also called for more useful information
and for a practical means of relating costs to mission . Super-
ficially, at least, it would appear that with the arrival of McNaraar
and PPB, Congress now had the comprehensive Defense budget so long
advocated.
s tue defense program unfolded with McNamara exercising
central control over the Department, commanding an enormous fund





of knowledge, and presenting a carefully integrated budget, Congressional
uneasiness and concern gradually mounted. Fart of the uneasiness
sould be traced to the past nature of the relationship between Congress
uad the Department of Defense wherein Ions and rivalries within
the Department allowed the Con to pla\ one Service against the
other. ith the advent of the new budgeting approach, the area for
Cpngres :ional maneuver and bargaining declined, although relations with
the Services remained close. It would be a mistake to trace Congres-
sional uneasiness solely to this apparent decline in influence. The
emerging policies of the nea Secretary of ;an to create
uuine concern on substantive issues. tny members of the Congres-
sional committees were veterans of the postw wrings and conflicts
over defense programs. They were h stole and they had
pi m important role in assuring the adoption of sc of the key
won ystems in the Mean arsenal. Congressional pressure had
had much to do with the decision to develop thermonuclear weapon:, to
push ahead with the Polaris pr r forced draft, and to remedy
deficiencies in the strategic nuclear posture in the wake of the first
. eutnlk . The record testifl tars and representativ
every right to ct a respectful hearing for their w











elflc ; v could logically be grouped into three major
categories:
1. the relationships between the civilians and the military and
the relative influence of II roups in the resolution of major
issues.
2, the kind .f weapon systems that the United States should be
developing, both nuclear and conventional.
.
the role of nuclear weapons in .-lean 3 strat and
policy.
In the summer of 1961, members of the Horn .mate became
concerned on learning that state meats prepareu by military officers for
presentation to the committees of Congress In . g >n had
been abject to review and clearance by c es4 This review included
censorship by both the Departments of Defense ana State, Although the
Congress, after holding hearings on censorship of public speeches by
top military officers, generally h the policy principles, they
fded censorship of testimony before Congressional committees as
dy objectionable* The Senate Armed Services Committee stated that
this was an "improper practice and can only be calculated to obstruct
unciulx the free flo; of information to which the Conor: e
^Report of the Special Prepar Subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee ( Hit ry Cold p ucation and Speech






It was accept i i military officer,: testifying before con *s
of Coi: v ad the obligation to i icial Defease Department
policy on tb -r coe m, 1. ar, ther as a stroi
e military offie i also be free, after
setting out t oartrrent position, t their bnions
long as t - . If high-ran officers were
n>t free to do this, Jon r : tricted to hearing on •
presentations reflecting the viewi of i scretarj of Defense. Congress
almost uniformly believed that arbitrary ana unjustified restriction
upon the free ftoi of information to the Congress can oni> have the
ect of hampering the legislative bran;.; Government in the
f Iti constitutional duties and functions.
T ! up were 1 to inv te cen ip of
ranking military officers. However, te:: censors who
LCtual eciitin >arred from testify in
order of President Kens . b .ted February ,
,
Namara was authorized to a ntroversial claim ol .utive
priv'i
. The letter read in part:
I have concluded it would be contrary to the puolio interest
to make available any information which would enable the sub-
committee to identlf - hold accountable any individ ith
respect to any oarticular eh that he has revie . I there-
fore direct you and all personnel under jurisdiction of your
e :ent, not to give any testimony or produce any document
euld disclOJ such information; I am lssuin
11 ceport of the I eemitteo of tb .ate
Armed Services Committee (Military Cold ar Education and Speech
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instructions to the Secretary of State.
The principle which is at stake here cannot be automatically
applied to every request for information. Each case must be
judged on its own merits. But I do not intend to permit sub-
ordinate officials of our career services to bear the brunt of
Congressional inquiry into policies which are the responsibilities
of their superior; .
In presenting the above letter, McNamara advised the subcommittee
that he was responsible for running his department, anci that he would
make any explanations he thought necessary. Further, he advised that
the committee could not go behind his statements in exploring why
deletions were made. 7 Chairman John Stennis (P. Miss. ) permitted
the claim of "executive privilege" to stand, and members of the sub-
committee failed to appeal the decision.
tills the Democrat-controlled subcommittee expressed grave
concern over what it considered a direct curb on the information
Congress could receive from military officers, it permitted the Es-
tablishment of a precedent for total arbitrary secrecy to be established
under the claim of ''executive privilege. M The subcommittee report
recognized ... it is not inconceivable that direct and specific questions
on matters of vital importance ma overlooked if the military oitness











of Congress cannot be expected to know every detailed aspect of all
matters presented to them. Therefore, without a full and free presen-
tation by the knowledgeable military people, the Congress cannot obtain
the full benefit of their specialized, and expert views and thought". It
is unthinkable that in our deliberations we should be restricted to the
views and opinions of the Secretary of Eefense. *®
V hile a L.cNamara directive helped create the events culminating
in the hearings, he managed to emerge stronger than before, with
bolstered confidence in his ability to handle criticism in the Pentagon
and in Congress.
Hanson V . Baldwin, military /.Titer for The New York Times,
wrote a scathing attack on "McNamara's Monarchy;" in focusing atten-
tion on the TI ard prior to hearings before the Senate Pei -nt
Subcommittee on Investigations, Baldwin stated:
etions or dissent, even to Congress, are discourag
muted or, when possible, stifled. r. McNamara has pressured
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to sign written statements testifying to
Congress that the Administration': defense budget is adequate.
He has censored, deleted and altered statements to Congress by
the chiefs of the services and their secretaries. He has down-
graded, ignored, bypassed or overruled the advice of the Joint
Cnidfs of Staff.'' He continued that, although : cNamara had not
forced the military services to speak with one voice, 'he h
come closer to it than anyone before him. "^












with McN rtlclpants with mixed Ei of anger, frustra-
tion, confusion and admiration. The ability of lV:cNamara for intelligent,
incisive and sometimes profoundly simple logic or 'his habit of marsh. 1-
ling a aazzling array of statistics to support his case in Congressional
testimony baa dismayed and irritated the Southern con
Armed Services Committees. -^ irritation is all the more justified
'When the Congressmen later discover they have been hoodwinked by
McNamara's tactic of supportin oak argument I a adroit com-
bination of statistics and sophistry.' Ls remarkable mentis- lp-
ment served as sward and buckler ... in his scraps with Congress,
Ich became mere- bitter the years passed. To bury
criticism under a flood of facts is an old technique, but no one
mastered it better than McNamara. " 1 ^
. t a time when the steady accrual of power bj the executive
branch has become a concern to many, McNamara helped accelerate
this tr y providing the management tools the executive needed to
nipulate -what power it bad and to acquir re. J-^
iiNeil .shsuhan, You Don't Knc re Johnson Ends and
feiaar in;", The New York Time itober 22, ]
p. 131.
iSstuart Alsop, "After 7 , ' I .11 to McNamara, ''•
The - ssilngtos rch , 1968, p. I .
a, op. cit.
, p. : .

Although McNamara spoke out on a number of occasions to defend
the right of dissent over Vietnam, within the Defense Department itself
he practiced something akin to the democratic centralism of Lenin. He
permitted free discussion only vale a decision was in the process of
Lng made. However, he would become acutely irritated if the pre
and cons of discussion became a matter of public knowledge and debate
through the press. Once a decision had been made he would tolerate
no dissent. Pentagon officials became more frightened of frank dis-
cussion with journalists and outsi iers than the officials of any other
executive department in Washington.^
Sheehan, describing McNamara, notes:
He studies a problem with such care and listens to so many
opinions before making up his mind that when he does reach
decision he apparently develops an unshakable faith in its correct-
ness. Thus, when McNamara makes a mistake, he is prone to
make a big one and to defend it relentlessly in the face of criti-
cism. 16
During the hearings on PPB in August 1967, Senator Jackson
expressing concern over the greater centralization of the decision
process stated that, whether intended or not, voices of dissent at
lower levels have considerable difficulty getting themselves listened
to, on many critical issues, at high DCD levels. He also cited the
danger that officials are tempted to embrace quantitative studies as
l 5ibid.
, pp. I2c-129
I6lbld, , p. 180,









the final word and not ask the necessary mean, hard questions required
to make sound decisions. 1 '? "People can really be snowe the
figures, and the elaborate statistics on costs and gains — which have
been weighted on the basis of the assumptions and premises of the
systems analysts. Unknown, unquantiftable, contingent factors can then
vitiate these premises and assumptions and completely change what the
jision should have been . . . Trie fellow who controls the system can
manipulate it ana almost rig it. "The bargaining in the Pentagon is
weighted in favor of GSD and its analysts. Not all the participants in
the adversary-process are on a parity. "^
Other concerns raised by Congress included the transfer of
decisionmaking in terms of weapon systems and defense functions from
the Joint Chiefs and their associates to the civilian component in the
Defense Department. The skepticism was addredded to civilian-trained
people questioning dollar costs as paramount while military personnel




**^ The .Senate in an attempt for equality with
the Executive Branch passed 8.355, The Legislative Reor ition Act
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of 1967. The House has never acted on this bill which would establish,
among other provisions, "a PPB equivalent for the Legislative Branch,
stocked with or programmed for the same information as the Executive
system; and, second, it would require a system of interrogation with
potential for varying response to jive ... the basis for making a judg-
ment in passing upon the recommendations of the Executive. ; '^1
The fears of Congress, expressed principally during hearings on
;cific issues, reflected the growing centralization of decisionmaking
power in the Executive Branch, th« agrading of military experience
and judgment, and the inability of the Congress to look behind issues
due to censorship and the security classification of information considered
necessary to the understanding of key decisions.
The TFX Controversy
Congressional hearings on the experimental tactical fighter known
as the TFX began on February 26, 1963 amid charges of favoritism and
conflict of interest. It should be noted that neither of these char>
could be supported, but circumstances leading up to contract award and
subsequent events resulted in heated controversy between DOD military
and civilian elements and the Congress, which continue.1.- today.
The TFX had its origin in the late fifties, a time when military











widespread feeling prevailed that manned combat aircraft had a question-
l@ future. Both the Air Force and N: ere independently planning
for replacement of the current generation of fighter aircraft. The Air
lorce, anticipating the replacement of the F-105 and F-100, focused
attention on a t Leal Teak through — a vari metry" wing
that co-old be swung forward for short takeoff capability and swept
ard for supersonic flight. ir Force design provided for a
ivy fighter-bomber that could take off from , 3 /-foot unpaved run-
s and fly for long distances at fuel*! avin, high altitudes. On entry
over enemy territory, it would be able to plunge down to within a few
hundred feet of the ground and make a 400-mile supersonic dash under
defensive radar screens to deliver nuclear bombs. No other plane could
then, or can now, fly supersonicaliy any no tantial distance at very
low altitudes. **
The Navy needed a "combat air patrol" to counter a defensive
weakness against enemy bomb or missile carrying aircraft. In addition
to being able to take off from aircraft carriers, the Navy wanted a plane
with ability to "loiter H at high altitudes, 150 miles from the fleet, detect
enemy aircraft by radar and launch sophisticated computer-guided
ssiles to destroy them.








the production programs for the Navy F4H and <.ir Force F-105 con-
vinced LicNamara that one aircraft, the F4H, could meet the need for
the Air Force as well as the Navy, and do it better than the F-105.
The advantages of one weapon system over two are obvious.
They result in substantial savings not only in the development,
test and production st: but throughout the life of the system
in terms of logistic support, maintenance, training programs and
operations.
accordingly, further procurement of the F-105 has been
terminated and the F4H, no. Lgnated the F-4, will be bought
for both the Air force and the Navy.
-ui the experience of the t -4 in mind, McNamara directed the
Navy ana the Air force to combine efforts, with the ^ir Force as
project manager, to design a single fighter plane to meet proposed
requirements. He was convinced that at least $1 billion in development,
production, maintenance and operating costs could be saved; further that
a plane of genuine tactical utility to both services could be delivered
within the projected time frame. The Air Force need for long range
and the low altitude supersonic dash dictated a large heavy configuration
due to fuel requirements; the Navy objected, claiming an aircraft of
such weight could not fly off its carriers and would provide no capability
^Hearings, TFa Contract Investigation, Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government Operations, 88th
Congress, 1st Sess. , torch, 1963, Part 2, p. 378.
SbRooert S, McNamara, Testimony oefore the mmittee of
ense Procurement of the Joint iLconomic Committee of Congress,
rch 2c, 19C
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for addition of later developed weapons. kicNamara insisted on a hi
ree on
,: commonality ' of parts in I I o versions of the aircraft to
oe built. The difference in needs of the two servlc upled
nmonality dictum set tt for the controversy which continue
today,
£iy in 1962, the rivalry for trie TFX narrows n to two
jor firm; . The Boeing Company of Seattle, ashington, plannea to
build the plane at its plant in .\ itchita, Kansas, The (General E ics
Corporation of Fort .ortu, Texas, cooperating with Grumman Engineer-
ing Company of Bethpage, New York, planned to build the Air Force
Version in Texas and the Navy version in New York. Political figur
from the four states immediately became involved.
mentioned earlier, after an unprecedented four rounds of
design competition, McNamara overruled the military source selection
board and awarded the TFX contract to General Dynamics on November
24, 1962. McNamara testified:
lamination of the facts, in consultation with my ad-
visor s, convinced me that, as compared with the Boeing proposal
the General Dynamics proposal v. Lbstantially closer to a
single design, requiring only relatively minor modifications to
adapt it to the different requirements of the Navy and the Air
Force, and that it embodied a more realistic approach to the
cost problem. Accordingly, I decided to select General Dynamics
as the lopment contractor, since I concluded that it was best
qualified to design the most effective airplane that could be pro-
duced at the least cost, in the least time, to meet our military
requirements.
•
In further explanation of the award, McNamara stated that the
Source Selection Board, using factors weighted by judgment, made a
recommendation which appeared to p3 ! reater emphasis on operational
areas rather than on dependability of .opment and predictability of
costs. He stated that this was not a case of military-civilian conflict
but rather one of placing emphasis where it must be placec.
mator John L. McClellan, chairman of the Permanent Cub-
committee on Investigations, was requested by Senator Jackson to
inquire into the TF3! contract. '"The McClellan subcommittee investiga-
tors questioned witnesses, examined basic documents and established:
(1) The four ; :rvice evaluations did favor Bo
(2) The Boeing price was $100 million lower on the first phase of
the contract, and it might be $415 million lower on the total job.
(.;) The Pentagon eource Selection Board, composed of top generals
imd admirals, was unanimous in its finding that the Boeing plan^.-
would be cheaper and better.
(4) The only document at the Pentagon that supported the General
Dynamics plane was a five-page memorandum of justification,
dated November 21, 1962. It igned by ivlcNamara; Eugene
wuckert, Secretary of the i ir Force; and Fred Korth, Secretary
of the Navy. (This document contained errors in arithmetic of
Ibid.




M . . ; i
. million and $22 million.) :
Thi Jlellan investigators found conclusive evidence that the only
cost studies avail: bl< to McNamara contained substantial error; — errors
of tfc mitude of $290 million ^nd \ .lillion. Further, that
McNamara had made attempts in April, to reconstruct a re core to
ablish justification for his decision six month;- earlier. Testimony
already on file sh efforts to pressure career military -men into
changing their position and supporting McNamara, aaeaawhile the Pentagon
lorated documents and statistics to prove their decision, The one
document tie; McClellan subcommittee needed was a file memorandum
dated March 1, 1963, from Albert . Blackburn, the key TFX technician
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Blackburn, an aeronautical
engineer and test pilot with an outstanding at record* staffed the
TF3> program for two years and was, perhaps, 'the t-informed man
on TFX in America. M lied to t , he stated:
There : s no real, supper _ case to be made_for his
//McNamara'^/ choice of
. .
._/Gsner:jl Dynamics/ on t junds
of operations, technical man t consideration .
The Secretary MlcNamara/ chose to make a decision on the
sis of information different from t iluated under t
estabi ground rules.
nator IvIcClellan initiated other studies and requested the GAO
to make : 'an independent review of the cost standards prepared by the
^Clark B, Mollenhoff, The Pentagon, (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1967), p. 303.
30MsLi pp- ~' i-~ •
.J-
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Air Pore-.- and us ; the Department of Defense in making its decision
on the award of the contract. " McClellan ar the GAG to make
'careful distinction t sen fi ures avail is prior to the iward
to General Dynamics and the aftjr-tne-fact studie .
Cn pril 19( , 3j replied: bave found no independent or
addition- 1 cost esti ring the TFJ program as a whole, and
the Secretari— advise us that none exist... Both Secretary McNamara
and Secretary '- uckert have stated to us that the conclusion _ reachei
then sre on 1 tsis of their y. at, rather than on independent
/cost/ studies, '
e hearings on the TFX u*tq suspended aft assassination
of 1 resident Kennedy. However, in the fall of . reports of scandal-
ously high costs of the TFX project 1 out to r the interest of
nator McClellan. "Pentagon secrecy covered the details of costs,
progress ano. performance on the F-lll v.arplanes, and frustrated the
efforts of tl sClellan... Subcommittee. Defense Secretary L'/cNamara
exhibited the same reluctance to make detailed information on the F-J.1I
costs ana performance available to the Senate and House Armed
•vices Committees. Althouoh there were periodic complaints and
almost constant grumbling about MeNamara's refusal to provide in-
formation for Congress, he rod'- through more than five years without
- TI S Contract Investigation, Part 3, p.
m
a shall i . i of the broadest arbitrary authority.
"
At current istimates, the aircraft v. ill cost approximately |®, 6
million each, over three times the original estimat . The Navy version,
now three year.; t schedule and ly overweight as to allow
little room for 'growtl , LI be severely mission limited. =rious
questions have been raisea as to v. I ir or not the Navy will pro jure
any more tnan a "token 1 quantity. 'Considering everythin , sNamara's
first major defense purchase doesn't no^ seem much of a bargain.
The Nuclear Carrier
Coincident with the arrival of McNamara as Secretary of I e,
the Navy was faced with a serious problem of block obsolesence of the
surface fleet. ith relatively few exceptions, combatant surface shi;
had been built curing , . II and were rapidly reaching the end of normal
service life. In the period from 1954 to 1959, the Navy selectively
modernized a number of these ships to extend service life while attempt-
ing to convince LCD of the necessity of a repla; at shipbuilding
program. In this came period, the Navy completed construction of
three nuclear-powered surface warships: the aircraft carrier U. V. .
enterprise, the cruiser U. :,, ' . Long Beach, and the guided-missile
frigate U. V>. Z. Bainbridge. The success of the nuclear-powered surface
32Mollenhoff, op. cit. , pp. S22-8J -
lexander, oy>. cit.







warships convinced the Navy of the increased effectiveness in mobility
and flexibility .mined over conventionally powered warships,
E'vicNamara had rejected all starts on new construction of surface
warships in his first two years in office, and was opposed to a nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier on the basis of cost. The Navy persisted and
included a request for a nuclear-powered carrier in the Fiscal Year
1963 budget. In spite of Congressional pressure, expert testimony, and
public trial in newspaper and magazine articles, AicNamara directed
Secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth on October 9, 1963, to proceed with
ft conventional carrier. On the same date nator John Pastore,
(Dem.
, R. I.), Chairman of the Joint Committee or
wrote to xvlcNamara calling attention to the published reports and
r.iterath concern of the committee over the lack ot information
on plans for utilizing nuclear power and Informing him that hearin
were planned on the subject. Senator E astore ana mc rs of his
committee »ere unanimous!) in JVYi-67 being nuclear-
powerea since it provided 'significant milit i advantages for surface
warships.
The hearings opened on Octc D, 19€ , -nator ±- astore
commented that the October 9 uecision of McNai was deliberatel
cone to foreclose this committee from carrying out its responsibilities.
°4 Report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (Nuclear
Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessils), December, 1963, . 8th Con
1st




... Now the only way you can cure this - reversal, which is alwa\
much harder to do.
The testimony sol'.il.. favored a nuclear carrier. Admiral David
L. McDonald, Chief of Naval Operations, named to replace Admiral
George Anderson, .mo was dropped after hi t itimon> contradicted
ra on the TF2 contract,' 1 t d:
The military advantages demonstrated thus far, together
with those which we confidently expect in the futur it
most iestrable for us to proceed with the introduction of nuclear
power into naval surface ships as rapidly as our due 1 111
permit... In this connection, the long range fiscal implication?
promise savings in the eventual reduction of oil storage, fleet
oilers, and related logistics economic . tile statin per-
sonal preference, he added: v e accept the Secretory of Det<
decision that it shall be conventionally propelled ana concur in
his belief that uist get on with the construction of this ship
with minimum v?la .
Representative Kelvin Price (Dsm. , 111. ) questioned Secretary
Kortn and Admiral McDonald concerning the statement of accepting the
decision of the Secretary of Defense in order to avoid eela . hat
would be the cause of aeia, in the t jretarj : Trained
this would be a nuclear-powered carrier. , Price ask .
:
'If he hau determined, Congressman Price, that this was to be a
nuclear carrier, we would proceed with dispatch, " Korth repli .
SSHearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (Nuclear
Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels), sss, 1st Sess.
, p. 20,
36^ mu, op. cit.
, p. .... .




were unwilling to delay for furtl of si- month; or any indeter-
Lnable time into the future a decision on -.-nether it to be nuclear
or conventional,
"Then what would cause the
to pin th 'lit>.
tsl} in further facts I to
convince nim that nuclear propulsion U a appropriate means of
propulsion than conventional," Nav v ! icr Korth -ed. i -
:j'al RicKover testify
I think t t eost-effectiven Lonally us
to kill something — to kill it by it to death. The use of
studies for this purpos n in Washington. The qui
tion of nuclear propulsion for the carrier John F. Kennedy
/_CVj i—67/ is a g . \ 1 .
we discussed earlier today, making the John F. Kennedy
nuclear power ; . i liy to th capability
of the fleet. However, the decision on this ship was delayed a
ar while th to responc to a tst to 'under-
take a comprehensive, quantitative study 1 ' of whether "the future
Mai ill, in full use ...clear power. It
requested that the study "consider the design of the future carrier
striking Tor:: in the broadest
|
were
asked such as: How many escort af what type shou]
Included* Should . ....: in the conventioi
manner, or should it invision added emphasis on nuclear sub-
rin . Hou is replenishment of aviation fuel and or. to
be accomplished^ Should the underway replenishment ships also
;.r . H< . .0 Lc be deployed around the .orld"t
ould nuclear power speak for a modification of the present
concept >l
will have a large number of conventionally powered surf:
ve ntory far to come, he
approach the ultimate design hat are the implications or force
38M -
•t
mid nuclear vision allow us to the tot
number of carriers and/or carrier task forces'*
U I his wa* am ered, more were
asked* The scope of these studies is so vast and i that all
irticipants could opend their lifetime at it,
a you know, a decision was finally made by the Department
of Defense against putting nuclear propuls
oraer
,:
to avoid further delay" in the construction of the ship.
But Ls it re ary to en in cost-effectiven :tudies
on the whole future of the Navy before we can decide to put
nuclear propulsion in
Many situations arise where those who have a superior
r.apon will take an action t j u] capon
not so good. Factors such as these are not susceptible to com-
puter ana]




If you are thinking twenty or thirty years from now, you cannot
afford to put In obsolete squipment.^O
. n - /- 1 ra ailed § gitnes , conceded V ffec-
tlveness of s nuclear red carrier, choice
would not stren then 1 relation to the Etu "I say
total force availa ;ur opinion, :<
protect a t military sure and we don't need
The Committ lot thi t the Soviet Id stand
. till and reasoned that it .0;. fool] on conventional power in
Initial Memorandum, 'Planning-Programming-Budgeting, ; ' U. .
Senate Su - on National -rity and International . rations,
I Oth Congress, 1st Sess.
, pp. 4"-44.
'-^Report, Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels, " op. cit.
,
p.





t carrier destined to b "i^ : for years, Th McNamara
misinform* I performance ad^ i it
nuclear carrier, sNamars cost figures that nuclear
ships cot" ; t half 1' sonventior
The co cparli . on the costs )f the first nuclear ships.
Alth i ire difficult to obtain from McNamara, he finally
quoted a 140.4 mlllio • ainst
i . Ulior ' r I convent! >ni I carr? ?.
Th-: Joint C tittee pointed out:
Th rl ;f nuclear
propulsion for surface ships ... For example, it was claimed that
.i
•
carrier able of carrying an i
ditional squadron of aircraft. The purchase and operation costs




the nuclear-propelled ship and used as a cost argument against
nuclear pro] 1 >n. T ly tripled I tited
to the nuclear carrier over its lifetime. Obviously, the additional
re not r 1 •. to nacl r pr m and can inated
by not supplying the additional squadron of aircraft . . . / lso, in the
onstruction jof -o c :t cc i,
/$S2, 000, 330/ which provide fuel for at least seven years, wer<
.i o\ : ilear tJ >mpars
fuel costs were attributed to the conventional carrier. 42
It developed that if comparable costs r employed, the lifetime
cost of the nuclear carrier, with all of its aircraft, was approximately
three percent more than a conventional carrier similarly Lpped. The
Joint Committee declared; It is apparent that the increased cost of
nuclear power is not significant in relation to its demonstrat 1111






V.hen McNamara was asked why he did not buy the best and most
advanced aircraft carrier, he replied: "We don't buy the best there is
in terms of technology in one of our weapons systems. a would be
foolish if we bought the best ... in terms of speed and range and fire-
power, when we don't need it... e should buy only what we need and
and what we need is usable effective combat power. "44
The committee took Strong exception to the above and asked
McNamara what authorities, technical or military advised him to decide
against nuclear propulsion in the new carrier . McNamara testified
that he talked with Navy Secretary Fred Korth; Admiral David McDonald,
Chief of Naval Operations, Captain (now Rear Admiral) Vincent P. de
Foix, former commanding officer of the U. L-. i.. enterprise; Dr, Glenn
T. Beaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; and Vice
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, manager, Naval Reactors, Division of
Reactor Development.
The Joint Committee noted in its report that: "All of the above
mentioned persons testified to the committee that they had recommended
that the new carrier be equipped with nuclear propulsion. H Dr. Harold
Brown, former Director of Defense Research and Dngineering, conceded
that all the military and technical men he knew "have taken an
43Ibid.
^Hearings, ' Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels,
op. cit.
, p. 1 .
mo
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unequivocal position that there is no question at all about it that nuclear-
propelled surface ship: much superior ana have tremendous military
advantages over conventional" ships. ^
The committee report noted the lack of any real support for
McNarnara: "In summary, the committee still does not know of any
qualified technical person or group who recommended to the Defense
Department that nuclear propulsion not be installed in the new aircraft
carrier.^
It appeared to be the rough Judgment 2nd intuition of McNarnara
inst the technical experts and military men. Also, a McNarnara
decision apparently required no competent studies to support it.
"On May 5, 1965, Representative illiam H. Bates
(Hep.
,
Mass. ) told the House that according to Department of
Defense cost studies, a conventional carrier is more expensive
than a nuclear carrier when the cost of oilers are figured into
the analysi . "This ir borne out, " he told colleagues, ;! in a
detailed classified analysis submitted to the Joint Committee on
Atomic Enargy on January 13, 196S by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Mr." Charles J. Hitch. "4/
By mid-1965, it too late to correct what has been
called a multi-million- dollar blunder. Representative Mendel
Rivers (Dem.
, S. C. ) chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee, called the decision an error in judgment and reported
that Admiral Rickover feels that progress on the U. x. U John F.
Kennedy now makes conversion to nuclear power too expensive.
The damage had been done, and the U. . . . . John F. Kennedy was
destined to travel the seas in the nuclear age dependent upon fuel
4 5ibid.
, p. 131.
^Report, Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels,
"
op. cit.





from a fleet of oilers — an ''obsolete" monument tc the McNamara
reign at the Pentagon. Representative Chet Holifield (Dem. , Cal.
)
vice chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in an
exchange of letters with Rivers pointed out that "the only new
surface warship authorized for our naval striking force in the
1963, 1964, 1965, and 1966 programs is the aircraft carrier ...
U. S. E. John F. Kennedy. 4fc
Klaus Knorr, Director, Center of International Studies, Princeton
University, reviewing the testimony wrote:
I read with care McNamara' s 1963 testimony on why he
preferred a conventional-fuel to a nuclear-fuel aircraft carrier.
In his very lengthy testimony, McNamara came back again and
again to the difference in money costs but, though several
senators pressed him with intelligent :.nd pertinent questions,
he never explained why the advantages of the nuclear carrier
were not worth the difference in these costs. He contented
himself with stating flatly that he did not think they were, while
citing eagerly and at length some dubious analogies: whj he
personally was better off buying a medium-price rather than a
high-price automobile; why a farmer, having to transport produce
to the market from time to time, might be better off with a
cheaper and slower truck rather than with a speedier and more
expensive one. The trouble with these analogies is that they
explain the cost-effectiveness principle — especially, a stripped-
down version of it — but they do not explain at all the superiority,
as a buy, of a conventional over a nuclear carrier. Obviously,
Secretary McNamara has far better information on the factors
affecting his choice of automobile than he could possibly have
about the future utility of different aircraft carriers in different
contingencies whose probabilities are unpredictable. He also
could easily make some simple assumption about the hypothetical
farmer's transportation problem, but similar assumptions about
the future missions of aircraft carriers are more difficult to
make. I had the strong impression that the money- cost differ-
ence and the stripped- down cost-effectiveness model were fore-
most in the Secretary's mind, and that the very complicated
guesswork on possible demands on aircraft carriers some years










Th pie: sited r only t Lsions of a ch ea;
under Congressional ini ition durii :cNamara regime. Almost
without exception, the pattern /.as repeated. Information upon which
cislon was inaccurate, not available , classify ,
on improper assumptions, or biased j votive views of the future.
Money costs pr ieclsion process and sffecti\ was
n little attention. The judgment of technical and military advisers
was held sec ry to that of t analyst: : f t' Depart . of
Defense, and sufficient evidence ' rts to Lnt te or stifle
criticism it: in DOE and to justify jision , after the fact, with




"To expect, however, that the method itself (which distributes
Indulgences to some and deprivations, to others) would not be
subject to manipulation in the political process is to say that
we shall be governed by formula and not by men. — WUdavskyl
Retrospect
In a reign extending just over seven years, Robert S. McNamara
brought about two major revolutions in t ; apartment of Defense, He
I the military strategy and forces of the United States, and, at
the came time, '- ; U an entirely new method of making defense
icions. To "date the magnitude and scope of such a task, one
need only look at the size and com >f the Department of Defense
and its history of resistance to chang . ich utili
t lysis or cost-effectiv lies to evaluate alternative
ins of ace Lng objectives within tlr T l inning-Programming-
Budgeting fram : has been applied to r' udgets — Fiscal
The speed and effic • .ich the new
1Aaron .. ilaavsky, The Politic- of the Budgetary i-rocess
,
(Boston: Little Brown & Co.
,






system was installed belies the risks and dangers as well as the op-
portunities in trying to move too far too fast in the application of new
management techniques. The costs in lowered service morale, delayed
acquisition of weapon systems, and Congressional concern are indicative
that the benefits of PPB and systems analysis may have oversold by its
proponents. The most significant result of the new techniques may be
the increased power given to the Secretary of Defense which in turn,
breeds fear that such a centralization of authority will silence the voices
of -.assent and reduce arguments that must be offered and heard.
Much of the unification of the services — and thus centralization
of authority — has been made inevitable by the technological changes in
weapons and the consequent changes in force structur . . McNamara
acknowledged that Defense never lost track of deciding what was needed
for national security and buying it at the lowest sound price, without
r gard to arbitrary budget ceilings or other factors. Concurrently
,
however, he stated: wOn many, if not most of the tasks of the Depart-
ment we can place some form of statistical measure and operate more
effectively because of it. "° Inherent in the McNamara method was
transfer of the real decisionmaking power from the military heads of
the services to the Secretary of Defense.
"ivmond, op. cit.
, p. 2! .




. ana aont, Vol. 1.3, No. 1 (October 1966), p. 44,




•The services had a direct confrontation . TcNamara's analysts
for the first time in 1162, ana the result was a nearly wholesale re-
jection of the service proposals. From that year, unfortunately, the
analytic process has often been associated with the refutation of service
aments rather than with the initiation and. channeling of coatinu
change. "4 Professional judgment or scientific him, ls downgraded
for perfection on paper and the ,: cost part of the cost-effectiveness
formula' 1 slowed the pace of military development. Before the services
developed an expertise in cost-effectiveness techniques, they tried the
piecemeal approach or soft-sell unsucessfully, so they tri for
less and received even less. As an example, in 1963, the Army asked
for half the helicopters it thought it needed for the air-cavalry divisions
and received half of what it asked for. In in 1965, the Army asked
for more helicopters for the Vietnam fighting ana saw its request severe-
ly cut. I [uently, McNamara had to ask for a supplemental appro-
priation for additional aircraft and helicopter,"; in 1966 with the attendant
uer price and lead time lost from the delayed decision.
»
:The PPB approach was used to justify the purchase of a $:
million oil-fueled aircraft carrier tfe t as obsolete before it was
take, op. cit.
, p. 10.
^Hanson . Baldwin, "Slowdown at the 3 on y Foreign
/ ffairs
, Vol. 43, Nos. 1-4 (October 1964 to July 1965), p. 263.
6c. . Borklund, ''Cost Effectiveness vs. Creativity: Part I,
"




perversion of cost- effectiveness was used, after the
fact, in the largest single military aircraft contract in history, to
rationalize the choice of an airplane whose costs are soaring, if not its
performance .. . Cost-effectiveness study, like an r management
tool, can be misused — to becloud rather than eluminate ju it in t
cutive Branch and Con; r . "7
This paper, in reviewing the role of systems analyi ithin the
decision framework of PF aminin the literature and testimony
recording several of the more controversial decisions, set out to
tablish safeguards to assure that the new management techniques
not uisplace, rather than aid conventional military wisdom with a
ste aatlzed Ionic. In the process, ral conclusions and recommen-
dations were reached and are offered in an attempt to focus attention on
ureas the writer con. .iportant.
Concr
The c ntralisation of aecipiom ta] fense
f and Its allocation ions i t- key e _i tt of tb
present DOD management process. it : nee sarji for
.•ff civilian control of the rnilit r hment, t pee or
tent ! control is a matter if it le. In i all organization complete
centralization may not t ental. In a large, more complex





atmosphere such as DCD the morale and judgment of lower level
managers may well be eroded.
In preparation of the 1985 budget, IvicNamara is said to have
made in excess of 503 decisions.- ch a high ree of centralization
cannot help but slow the decision process. Considering that McNamara
required full justification of any change proposal including forces, costs,
manpower, procurement, schedules, and financing considered appropriate
to the evaluation, enormous investment of time and manpower were
required even to submit a PCR. Review of the PCR process in 19<
indicated that nearly 50% of the proposals were rejected or substantially
changed." It can easily be seen that unpopular proposals can be end-
lessly rejected until the sponsor realizes that he has no recourse. If
the top decisionmaker has one view of the future and one set of value
judgments, only proposals meeting these criteria will be acceptable.
Under IvicNamara, decision "'thresholds M were established. For
new programs, the thresholds'' were absolute; all requests had to be
submitted. This often led to a circular dilemma. Since inventions
cannot be predicted, neither can their costs, which makes them high-
risk projects. \ ithout tangible cost figures, such high-risk projects
i-iaymond, op. cit. , p. 289.
cKinsey and Company, Inc., Management Consultants,
Preliminary Study of the Defense Department 1 -ment Flannin
I" rocess, M Memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)





cannot compete against proven systems, where costs and benefits are
known. Although decision ''thresholds" are not sacred, they should be
established with sufficient latitude that lower level innovation is not
stifled and realistically determined so that top management can allot
time to the really key decision;
,
Analysis is necessarily incomplete . Every system analysis has
its defects. Some of these are limitations Inherent in all analyses of
choice. Others are the consequence of the difficulty or complexity of
the question. The difficulty in predicting the future alone is sufficient
reason to question hov Car one should go in hedging against uncertainty.
Analytical techniques can focus the issues, but no mechanical aid can
. ;titute for intuition and judgment.
i nalysis is incomplete if for no other reason than the time and
money which can be allotted to it. The annual bi I cycle, itself,
induces a discipline and current experience has shown that over 30% of
Change proposals are : ' folded" into the annual budget revl Lthout
prior screening bj the Office of Sysl lysis.
The development of th< is analysis cult is not without its
atlve aspects. The pov. f insi . natural scientist and
the economist have certainly :een overrated. From special knowled
in one specific, admittedly difficult field, popular opinion has concluded
they are omniscient. The military has abdicated, too readily in many-
cases, before i ticated discussions of strategic problems by civilian








military analysts. Lven if the system requires that all problems of
armament, equipment and deployment be supported by scientific analysl
the final decision on what is to be achieved, when and how, is one of
leadership, and not of science. It would be a grave mistake to believe
that strategic theory can replace strs t
Private writing on strategic subjects v ill not easily reach
influence the strategic decisionmaker, but it readilj reaches the advisers
sad specialists on the staff, since they generally belong to the same
i jration ane. intellectual groups as the writers in universities and
institutes. Prom the advisory level, it jradually penetrai
.est policy-making circles, -i--1 ithin the military, there has harslv
n a writer of note on military strategy since the turn of the century
when Admiral Alfred Thayer Ivlahan was dominant. There have been
many views from the civilian side of the house recently, but few from
military strategists, however brilliant, i lthough the military is not
in the publish or perish'' school, if influential and timely thoughts are
not recorded, t Don evaporate.
Congress must continue to assert its right to investigate . Closely
allied to this is the thought that the military must not become so in-
timidated that the 5 fear to testify. The voice of dissent must be raised





ll lbid. , p. 131.
•
>2
recognized that only mutiny and chaos would prevail if aver,, military
member :r to protest in a manner similar to Admiral Rickover or
General Billy Mitchell, but national security is at stake, thei
issues must be raised. No one man, v en on idmitt riUiant
as McNamara, is infallible. L visions on the balance of forces and
complex weapon system d divergent viewpoint
The power centralized in the Pentagon is a useful power, an
essential power in the world in which we live. But it is a dangero
power, which carries with it the seeds for ruction of our political
institutions and our if life. It needs examination, constant In-
vestigation and criticism from within and from without. It needs to
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